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Chapter	VII	
The	Army	by	Nurture	&	the	Navy	by	Nature	
	
	 The	U.S.	Army	arrived	at	the	philosophy	of	scientific	management	organically	and	
largely	unintentionally.		That	journey	was	driven	largely	by	environmental	factors.	The	U.S.	
Navy	embraced	the	concepts	known	as	scientific	management	deliberately	and	forcefully.	
The	striking	difference	between	the	two	cultures	lies	at	the	heart	of	this	analysis.	The	Army	
and	Navy	both	confronted	daunting	change	at	the	dawn	of	the	twentieth	century.		Both	
were	inextricably	linked	to	preparing	for	war	and	the	officers	that	filled	their	ranks	valued	
similar	traits	of	leadership,	courage,	and	forbearance.	Nevertheless,	they	conducted	
operations	in	separate	and	distinct	environments.	Tools	of	their	trades	were	no	less	
diverse.	The	Navy	traded	in	vast	steel	seagoing	titans.	The	Army	dealt	in	bone	and	sinew.		
Similarities	and	differences	aside,	they	both	fundamentally	pursued	one	end	above	all	
others--	efficiency.		
	 Frederick	Taylor	bridged	the	Army	and	Navy	as	the	foremost	name	in	efficiency	in	
the	first	decades	of	the	twentieth	century.		He	embodied	the	bow	wave	of	managerial	
change	sweeping	through	American	factories,	industrial	establishments,	and	soon	
universities.	For	most	who	were	aware	of	his	theories,	Taylor	was	no	snake	oil	salesman	
pedaling	spurious	concoctions	from	the	back	of	a	gaudily-painted	wagon.			Taylor	had	a	
vision.		And	like	all	visionaries	his	dreams	and	ideas	of	change	generated	significant	
resistance.		Through	years	of	study	and	practical	experience	he	had	refined	his	methods	for	
improving	workplace	efficiency.	As	a	result,	as	earlier	discussed,	private	and	public	
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business	and	organizations	frequently	sought	Taylor’s	expertise	about	how	to	do	more	
with	less.		
	 	Taylor’s	involvement	with	the	Navy	predated	his	involvement	with	the	Army.		This	
contact	was	greater	not	only	in	chronological	order,	but	also	in	frequency	and	quantity	of	
correspondence.		It	appears	that	Taylor	personally	invested	his	interests	and	energies	
more	deeply	in	relations	with	the	Navy.		Of	course,	the	Navy	certainly	represented	the	
larger	quarry	of	the	two	services	by	a	large	measure.		Nevertheless,	his	engagement	with	
the	U.S.	Navy	bureaucracy	and	naval	officers	were	demonstrably	stronger	that	those	with	
U.S.	Army	counterparts.	Last,	the	Navy	and	Taylorism	shared	a	common	nature--	that	of	
machines.		It	is	necessary	to	emphasize,	however,	that	scientific	management	for	Taylor	
and	the	U.S.	Navy	officers	with	whom	he	dealt	was	not	merely	a	set	of	procedures	for	
tinkering	with	the	production	and	repair	of	machines;	it	embodied	a	mindset,	a	way	of	
thinking.	In	the	end-	it’s	all	about	time.	
	 Fortune	appeared	to	favor	Taylor,	but	only	in	stints.		Captain	Casper	F.	Goodrich,	a	
long-time	family	friend,	proved	to	be	an	important	and	powerful	ally.	Goodrich	was	a	
strong	advocate	for	Navy	reform	and	served	on	the	Navy	Board	that	recommended	the	
establishment	of	the	Naval	War	College.351		Their	friendship,	by	tone	and	substance	clearly	
predated	the	1891	letter	between	the	two	which,	represents	one	of	the	earliest	
communiqués	between	Taylor	and	an	officer	of	the	Navy.		The	letter	was	composed	twelve	
years	before	Taylor	published	his	famous	work	“Shop	Management”	in	1903.352	
																																								 																				
351	Kuehn,	“The	Martial	Spirit—Naval	Style:	The	Naval	Reform	Movement	and	the	Establishment	of	the	
General	Board	of	the	Navy,	1873-1900”;	Ronald	H.	Spector,	Professors	of	War:	The	Naval	War	College	and	the	
Development	of	the	Naval	Profession	(Newport,	RI:	Naval	War	College	Press,	1977),	23–24.	
352	Taylor,	Shop	Management.	
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	 The	early	letters	between	Goodrich	and	Taylor	frequently	touched	on	matters	of	
work	and	family	in	nearly	equal	measure.		The	term	“Scientific	Management,”	as	yet	
uncoined,	never	entered	the	discussions,	although	statements	leavened	with	Taylor’s	ideas	
about	efficiency	turned	up	occasionally.	Generally,	the	warm	and	affable	missives	between	
Taylor	and	Goodrich	closed	with	some	variation	of	“love	to	all	the	family.”353		There	were	
signs	that	more	substantive	exchanges	occurred.		In	December	1891,	Goodrich	encouraged	
Taylor’s	early	success	by	observing,	“I	hope	things	are	running	now	without	hitch	and	that	
the	quantity	produced	is	as	ample	as	the	quality	is	satisfactory.		I	am	always	with	you	in	
spirit	and	am	always	wishing	you	the	best	of	luck	in	all	things.”354		
	 However,	near	the	end	of	the	century	Taylor	started	to	grasp	the	essentials	of	his	
system	while	working	as	a	consultant	at	Bethlehem	Steel.	In	March	1899,	Taylor	detailed	
information	about	his	work	in	a	letter	to	Goodrich	that	hinted	at	this	progress.	“It	would	
give	me	the	very	greatest	pleasure,”	Taylor	wrote,	“to	have	you	go	through	works	here	and	
look	over	the	various	lines	in	which	we	are	trying	to	make	improvements.”355		Goodrich	
was	unable	to	visit	and	it	appeared	his	pressing	naval	duties	took	a	toll	on	his	time	to	write	
as	well.		Taylor	pressed	ahead,	making	significant	advances	in	tool	development	and	
proclaiming	his	“new	scheme	of	management.”356	He	informed	Goodrich	in	a	letter	in	the	
summer	of	1900	as	to	his	progress.357		Goodrich	complimented	Taylor	on	his	successes	but	
did	not	as	of	yet	inquire	into	the	specific	details	of	Taylor’s	system.	Goodrich	appeared	
content,	as	friends	are	usually	accustomed	to	do,	to	accept	knowledge	of	a	friend’s	works	in	
																																								 																				
353	Frederick	Taylor	to	C.F.	Goodrich,	January	1892,	Box	21,	Frederick	Winslow	Taylor	Collection.	
354	C.F.	Goodrich	to	Frederick	Taylor,	December	29,	1891,	Box	21,	Frederick	Winslow	Taylor	Collection.	
355	Frederick	Taylor	to	C.F.	Goodrich,	March	14,	1899,	Box	21,	Frederick	Winslow	Taylor	Collection.	
356	Frederick	Taylor	to	C.F.	Goodrich,	June	16,	1900,	Box	21,	Frederick	Winslow	Taylor	Collection.	
357	Ibid.	
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the	most	general	terms.	However,	following	extended	service	at	sea	during	the	Spanish-
American	War,	on	September	1901	Goodrich	received	orders	to	take	command	of	the	
League	Island	Navy	Yard	outside	Philadelphia.		Discovering	that	his	new	command,	at	the	
naval	yard,	was	paralyzed	by	traditional	procedures	and	lacked	efficiency,	Goodrich	knew	
exactly	where	to	turn.358			
Frank	Copley	stated	in	Frederick	Taylor,	Father	of	Scientific	Management	(1923):	
It	will	be	remembered	that	one	of	the	reforms	effected	by	Goodrich	and	Newberry	
upon	the	recommendation	of	Taylor	was	the	concentration	at	League	Island,	in	
Philadelphia	of	all	the	tool	making	for	the	Atlantic	yards.		The	organization	of	this	
tool-making	shop	was	directed	by	Hathaway.		It	was	always	Goodrich’s	ambition	to	
have	Barth	employed	at	the	Brooklyn	Navy	yard,	there	to	establish	machine-shop	
standards	for	the	entire	service.359	
	
	 Chance	had	smiled	on	Taylor.	A	long	time	family	friend	given	a	key	position	within	
the	U.S.	Navy’s	shipyards	provided	Taylor	with	the	perfect	opportunity	to	refine	and	
expand	his	management	methods	on	a	scale	not	previously	possible.		The	old	adage	that	
“it’s	not	what	you	know,	but	who	you	know”	fits	aptly	here.	Nevertheless,	Goodrich,	like	
most	line	officers,	expressed	some	discontent	at	giving	up	sea	command,	exchanging	ship	
for	shore	duty.		Goodrich	did,	however,	confide	to	Taylor	that	“one	of	the	redeeming	
features	of	my	new	duty-which	I	frankly	do	not	like-	will	be	the	better	chance	of	seeing	you	
occasionally.”360		
	 The	administration	of	Theodore	Roosevelt	proved	a	formidable	proponent	for	
government	reform.		Goodrich	and	Taylor	benefited	from	the	strong	anti-union	stance	of	
Roosevelt	and	both	men	shared	a	similar	view	of	“loafers”	in	government	service	that	
																																								 																				
358	C.F.	Goodrich	to	Frederick	Taylor,	September	9,	1901,	Box	21,	Frederick	Winslow	Taylor	Collection.	
359	Frank	B.	Copley,	Frederick	W.	Taylor,	Father	of	Scientific	Management,	vol.	II	(New	York:	Harper	and	
Brothers,	1923),	304–305.	
360	Goodrich	to	Taylor,	December	29,	1891.	
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needed	to	be	removed.361	Still	unions	and	leisurely	labor	practices	persisted	within	
America’s	naval	yards.		
	 Goodrich	was	Taylor’s	oldest	ally,	but	not	his	most	ardent	supporter.	That	title	
belonged	to	another	officer.	Goodrich,	ten	years	Taylor’s	senior,	employed	a	refined	
political	acumen.	Thus,	Goodrich	approached	restructuring	of	the	naval	yards	obliquely,	if	
conservatively.		He	supported	Taylor	in	his	plans	for	the	installation	of	scientific	
management	ideas	reform	but	his	naval	career	superseded,	should	it	come	to	a	head,	any	
commitment	to	his	desire	for	substantial	reform.		
	 Goodrich	might	have	been	Taylor’s	oldest	ally,	but	he	was	not	his	most	ardent	
supporter.	That	title	belonged	to	another	officer.	Naval	Constructor	Holden	A.	Evans	
discovered	Taylor	through	a	combination	of	word	of	mouth	and	professional	
development.362	Taylor’s	reputation,	for	ill	or	well,	gained	considerable	reach	with	his	
publication	of	Shop	Management,	and	his	notoriety	increased	as	a	result	of	well-publicized	
conflicts	with	labor	leaders.		Whereas	Goodrich’s	appreciation	and	application	of	Taylor’s	
management	system	had	logical	and	reasonable	limits,	Evans	had	no	such	compunctions.	
He	deliberately,	if	with	a	degree	of	relish,	sacrificed	himself	on	the	shrine	of	Taylorism	and	
in	the	name	of	efficiency.363	
	 Ideas	have	the	potential	to	ignite	a	fire	in	the	hearts	of	those	who	embraced	them.		
Such	individuals	are	driven	by	single-minded	commitment	and	a	belief	in	the	purity	of	their	
cause.	They	will	immolate	others,	and	even	themselves,	to	see	those	beliefs	realized.			
Inspired	by	Taylorism,	Evans	sacrificed	his	marriage	and	later	his	career	in	a	crusade	to	
																																								 																				
361	Frederick	Taylor	to	C.F.	Goodrich,	May	7,	1891,	Box	21,	Frederick	Winslow	Taylor	Collection.	
362	H.A.	Evans	to	Frederick	Taylor,	June	28,	1906,	Box	116,	Frederick	Winslow	Taylor	Collection.	
363	Holden	A.	Evans,	One	Man’s	Fight	for	a	Better	Navy	(New	York:	Dodd,	Mead,	1940),	182.	
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implement	scientific	management	in	America’s	naval	yards.364	The	title	of	his	
autobiography,	One	Man’s	Fight	for	a	Better	Navy	(1940)	conveys	the	solitary	tenor	of	his	
journey.365	
	 Holden	A.	Evans	graduated	from	the	Naval	Academy	in	1892.	Poor	health	nearly	
aborted	his	career	before	it	was	launched.		However,	fate	smiled	on	young	Evans.	His	father	
was	a	“life-long”	friend	of	then	Secretary	of	the	Navy	Benjamin	F.	Tracy.		A	cordial	meeting	
put	the	matter	to	rest	in	minutes.366		However,	an	unfortunate	conversation	between	Evans	
and	Secretary	Tracy	placed	Evans	as	a	line	officer	rather	than	a	supervisor	of	naval	
construction.		This	occurrence	demonstrates	a	clear	demarcation	between	Goodrich	and	
Evans.	While	Evans	desired	nothing	more	than	a	career	in	the	field	of	shipyard	
management	and	eschewed	a	life	on	the	line,	Goodrich	loved	the	life	of	a	line	officer	and	
wanted	nothing	to	do	with	naval	yards.		After	a	short	tour	as	a	line	officer	Evans	was	sent	to	
Glasgow	University	for	an	education	in	naval	architecture	and	shipbuilding.367	In	1897,	he	
reported	to	Newport	Navy	Yard	to	begin	his	career	as	a	naval	constructor.368		
	 On	June	28,	1906,	Evans,	writing	from	the	Navy	Yard	at	Mare	Island	California,	
dispatched	the	first	of	many	letters	to	Taylor.369		In	this	missive	he	requested	a	half-dozen	
articles	and	Taylor’s	monograph,	Shop	Management,	because	he	was,	“…anxious	to	go	
further	into	this	subject…”370		Evans	was	ambitious	and	curious,	a	powerful	combination	
for	change.		A	prolific	publicist,	Taylor	rarely	wasted	time	responding	to	requests	for	
information	about	his	methods.		True	to	form,	Taylor	replied	to	Evans’s	request	on	July	4,	
																																								 																				
364	Ibid.,	88.	
365	Evans,	One	Man’s	Fight	for	a	Better	Navy.	
366	Ibid.,	59,60.	
367	Ibid.,	90.	
368	Ibid.,	111.	
369	Evans	to	Taylor,	June	28,	1906.	
370	Ibid.	
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1897	and	included	a	recently	published	article	titled	the	“Piece	Rate	System.”		He	then	
noted	that	he	had	“forwarded	the	balance	of	your	[Evans’]	lists	of	pamphlets	to	the	
American	society	of	Mechanical	Engineers,	with	the	request	to	them	to	forward	these	
papers	to	you.”371		Taylor	had	been	elected	president	of	the	ASME	that	same	year	and	made	
use	of	the	organization’s	staff	to	deal	with	such	matters.		
	 Over	the	next	several	years,	Taylor	found	himself	favorably	positioned	between	
Crozier	with	the	Army	and	Goodrich	and	Evans	with	the	Navy.	Crozier	and	Goodrich	both	
exercised	a	degree	of	caution	in	their	implementation	of	shop	management,	while	Evans	
utterly	abandoned	himself	to	the	cause.		Driven	by	his	belief	in	Taylorism	and	infused	with	
youthful	idealism,	his	single-minded	pursuit	of	efficiency	nearly	matched	that	of	Taylor	
himself.		He	was	not	so	fortunate	in	dealing	with	resistance	within	the	system	to	his	
advocacy	of	scientific	management.			Taylor,	unlike	Evans,	was	positioned	to	weather	the	
political	fallout	that	was	inevitable.		Crozier	and	Goodrich	understood	that	turmoil	with	
shipyard	workers	might	well	sink	any	prospects,	and	their	careers,	of	implementing	
change.		
	 Nevertheless,	Taylor	and	Evans	continued	an	active	correspondence	over	the	next	
several	years,	especially	during	1906-1909.		Taylor,	as	he	frequently	did	with	bright	
prospects,	invited	Evans	to	come	to	Philadelphia	to	see	shop	management	in	action,	Taylor	
suggested	a	stay	of	a	“week	to	ten	days”	that	he	might	“grasp	the	whole	system.”372		
Taylor’s	invitations	extended	to	others,	but	one	other	important	group	-men	of	influence-	
found	similar	favor.			
																																								 																				
371	Frederick	Taylor	to	H.A.	Evans,	July	4,	1906,	Box	116,	Frederick	Winslow	Taylor	Collection.	
372	Frederick	Taylor	to	H.A.	Evans,	April	29,	1907,	Box	116,	Frederick	Winslow	Taylor	Collection;	H.A.	Evans	
to	Frederick	Taylor,	July	30,	1906,	Box	116,	Frederick	Winslow	Taylor	Collection.	
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	 Taylor	discovered	by	chance,	or	perhaps	it	was	by	design,	that	shop	management	
found	greater	success	with	a	two-pronged	attack.	In	essence,	it	appears	that	he	attempted	
to	influence	engineers,	builders,	and	practitioners	such	as	Evans,	men	at	the	roots.	If	naval	
constructors	and	their	counterparts	in	other	industrial	establishments	adopted	shop	
management	for	its	benefits,	then	it	propagated	naturally	throughout	the	organization.	
	 	Taylor	possessed	a	sort	of	scientific	mystique,		an	aura	of	confidence		that	caused	
people	to	admire	him	for	mastery	of	a	complex	subject.		The	intellectual	prowess	of	such	
individuals	produces	an	allure,	a	magnetic	attraction	that	conflates	reality	with	magic	
within	the	apprentice.		The	master	demonstrates	an	ability	to	elucidate	data	with	elegance	
and	precision	that	infects	the	novice	with	curiosity	and	enthusiasm.		That	sort	of	person	
connects	opaque	relationships	between	disparate	aspects	of	the	topic	that	appear	obvious	
and	self-evident	but	only	in	retrospect.	Taylor	had	this	in	spades.			
	 As	previously	discussed,	the	most	common	terms	for	Taylor’s	ideas	were	shop	
management,	Taylorism,	and	scientific	management.		The	idea	evolved	with	time	like	the	
term	itself.		Initially,	shop	management	aimed	primarily	at	improving	the	mechanistic	
elements	of	a	factory.	Later,	the	idea	evolved	and	applied	to	the	individual,	not	just	
motions,	but	to	thought.		Evolution	of	the	concept	produced	the	more	powerful	element	of	
scientific	management.			
	 Evans,	the	paragon	naval	constructor,	found	himself	gripped	by	Taylor	and	his	
system.		However,	methods	and	processes	alone	do	not	generate	the	emotional	appeal,	the	
fervent	dedication	exhibited	by	Evans.	Rather,	such	adherents	began	to	grasp	quite	early	
the	potential	of	Taylor’s	system.373	For	Evans	it	was	a	subtle,	but	natural,	step	from	efficient	
																																								 																				
373	H.A.	Evans	to	Frederick	Taylor,	December	29,	1906,	Box	116,	Frederick	Winslow	Taylor	Collection.	
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action	to	efficient	thought.	He	believed	it	was	a	matter	of	time	until	shop	management	
became	the	law	of	the	land.		
	 Taylor’s	second	mechanism	for	the	promulgation	of	his	ideas	aimed	to	influence	
those	at	the	top.		For	example,	he	met	with	President	Theodore	Roosevelt,	the	Secretary	of	
the	Navy	and	the	Assistant	Secretary	of	the	Navy	to	discuss	his	system.	He	met	with	
senators	and	invited	them	to	visit	his	shops,	as	he	did	with	Evans.	Furthermore,	Taylor	
appeared	at	congressional	hearings	both	to	further	and	at	times	defend	his	system.	He	
frequently	entered	into	the	most	powerful	circles	of	American	politics.		
	 The	Navy	proved	more	important	than	did	the	Army	to	ensure	the	success	of	
Taylorism.		Complicated	machines	such	as	tanks	had	yet	to	be	invented,	and	wheeled	
vehicles	played	only	a	minor	role	in	the	Army	production	and	procurement	system	at	the	
turn	of	the	century.	On	the	other	hand,	the	Navy	produced	ships	ranging	from	frigates	to	
dreadnoughts,	the	largest	machines	the	world	had	seen.			As	well,	naval	yards	were	highly	
visible,	being	located	in	or	near	large	metropolitan	areas,	and	they	employed	significant	
numbers	of	workers.		The	public	and	politicians	remained	keenly	attuned	to	any	changes	at	
the	yards.		Thus,	navy	yards	promised	to	be	a	marvelous	site	for	the	implementation	of	the	
principles	of	scientific	management.	
However,	Taylor	and	his	disciples	faced	some	giant	obstacles.	If	Frederick	Taylor	was	David	
of	Old	Testament	fame,	the	workers	and	their	embryonic	unions	proved	to	be	his	Goliath--	
albeit	an	adversary	that	never	quite	stayed	dead.		Taylor	fought	them	at	every	turn.	He	
fought	them	in	private	industry.	He	fought	them	in	the	armories.		He	fought	them	in	the	
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naval	yards.	He	fought	them	in	government.374	But	he	did	not	fight	them	alone.	His	war	on	
inefficiency	enlisted	capable	men	in	every	theater	of	action	listed	above.	
	 Taylor’s	disciples	in	the	Navy,	primarily	naval	officers	responsible	for	ship	
construction,	demonstrated	an	unusual	degree	of	loyalty	to	Taylor	and	his	theories.	Line	
officers	were	found	in	their	ranks	as	well,	but	their	numbers	were	limited.		Taylor	
engendered	this	fidelity	by	nurturing	personal	relationships	and	advising	his	loyal	
supporters	whenever	they	encountered	an	obstacle.		He	regularly	advised	Crozier	and	
Evans,	among	others,	as	to	how	to	deal	with	workers	and	unions.375		
	 On	30	August	1907,	Evans	dispatched	a	letter	to	Chief	Constructor	W.L.	Capps,	
Commandant	of	the	Navy	Yard	at	Mare	Island,	California.	The	formal	request	entitled,	
“Piece	work-	Recommended	for	scaling	outside	plating	of	ships”	in	which	he	enumerated	
point-by-point	the	reasons	and	benefits	of	this	system.	Evans	ended	the	missive	with	his	
most	compelling	point,	stating	that	“…piece	work	was	briefly	discussed	with	the	Honorable	
Secretary	of	the	Navy	during	his	visit	to	this	yard	and	I	was	informed	by	the	Secretary	that	
he	would	approve	piece	work…”376	As	it	turned	out,	the	letter	to	Capps	proved	a	mere	
formality.		Less	than	a	month	later	Evans	had	his	answer.	Piecework	was	a	go.377		The	letter	
to	Capps	proved	a	mere	formality.	
	 President	Theodore	Roosevelt--	a	pragmatist	in	the	truest	American	sense--		valued	
utility	and	efficiency.			He	made	clear	those	values	to	members	of	his	cabinet.		Thus,	
Secretary	of	the	Navy	Victor	H.	Metcalf	had	no	real	objections	to	Evans’	proposal	for	
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piecework	at	the	navy	yards,	although	it	was	initially	limited	to	wood	caulking.378		Capps,	of	
course,	followed	suit.		In	his	response	he	directed	Evans	“…to	keep	a	careful	record	of	the	
quantities	and	costs	of	piecework	scaling	done…”	for	comparison	purposes.379		From	his	
conversation	with	Secretary	Metcalf,	Evans	inferred,		“…that	he	would	look	with	favor	on	
recommendations	for	the	extension	of	the	piece	work	system.”380		Over	the	following	
months,	Evans	wasted	little	time	in	implementing	and	extending	piecework	at	the	Mare	
Island	shipyard.	
	 Evans	and	Taylor	continued	to	exchange	ideas	on	piecework	and	shop	management.		
In	fact,	Evans	stated	in	one	communication	on	27	July	1908,	“your	[Taylor’s]	opinion	is	so	
valuable	that	I	have	taken	the	liberty	of	forwarding	your	letter…to	the	Navy	
Department.”381	This	demonstrated	Evans’	faith	that	Taylor’s	opinion	not	only	that	those	in	
the	Navy	would	know	of	Frederick	Taylor	but	that	his	views	carried	significant	weight.		
Taylor	found	himself	in	a	unique	position.		Because	of	his	friendship	with	Goodrich	and	
Evans	he	had	the	potential	to	exert	significant	influence,	and	he	did	so	as	an	intermediary	
shuffling	situational	or	tactical	level	information	from	lower	to	upper	echelons,	a	not	
uncommon	tactic	that	leaders	frequently	employ	to	get	unfiltered	information.		Evans	once	
cautioned	Taylor	about	blatant	meddling.382		The	Navy	might	not	look	kindly	on	this	kind	of	
collusion	if	revealed.		
	 The	outlook	improved	for	Taylor	and	Evans	with	the	appointment	of	Truman	H.	
Newberry	to	the	position	of	Secretary	of	the	Navy	in	December,	1908.	Newberry,	who	had	a	
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background	in	industry,	appeared	uniquely	open	to	shop	management.		However,	
Newberry’s	interest	extended	only	to	the	ends	with	little	regard	to	the	means.	If	scientific	
management	increased	efficiency,	and	in	the	end	saved	money,	he	fully	supported	it.383		
More	importantly,	Herbert	L.	Satterlee,	the	new	Assistant	Secretary	of	the	Navy,	appeared	
determined,	as	Evans	reported	to	Taylor,	“…	to	thoroughly	reorganize	the	methods	in	the	
navy	yards.”384		The	future	looked	bright	for	scientific	management.		
	 In	1908,	Evans	enumerated	in	an	article,	“An	Analysis	of	Machine-Shop	Methods,”	
the	processes	being	implemented	to	increase	efficiency.			Evans	repeatedly	addressed	the	
“…belief	that	all	Government	shops	are	inefficiently	managed…”	a	belief	with	which	he	
explicitly	disagreed.385	Yet,	his	arguments	belied	his	own	situation.	Evans	used	
considerable	ink	to	catalog	the	problems	that	government	officials	faced	that	civilian	
counterparts	did	not.		In	his	view,	unions,	bureaucratic	entanglements,	and	lazy	
government	workers	combined	to	reduce	the	efficiency	of	naval	yards.	To	combat	these	
maladies,	Evans	noted,	“I,	however,	believe	that	stop-watch	time	studies,	as	advocated	by	
Mr.	Taylor,	can	be	used	to	great	advantage	in	fixing	standard	time	for	premium	system.”386		
	 Taylor’s	influence	over	Evans	is	unmistakable.	Evans’	titled	his	1908	article	“An	
Analysis	of	Machine-Shop	Methods”	a	tribute	to	Taylor’s	Shop	Management.		Evans	
confessed,	“I	have	been	much	impressed	with	the	teachings	of	F.W.	Taylor…”387.			He	also	
noted	intellectual	inspiration	from	F.A.	Halsey,	a	prominent	mechanical	engineer	and	long	
time	editor	of	the	American	Machinist.		While	Evans	acknowledged	his	intellectual	debt	to	
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Halsey,	Evans’	published	works	and	his	correspondence	demonstrated	how	important	was	
Taylor’s	influence.		
	 On	19	November	1908,	Taylor	wrote	Evans	to	stress	the	importance	of	getting	the	
Secretary	of	the	Navy	to	approve	the	methods	of	scientific	management.388	Taylor	and	
Evans	were	working	against	the	clock,	for	time	and	politics	were	not	on	their	side.	They	
needed	to	implement	the	system	and	net	significant	results	before	the	unions	gained	
adequate	support	to	halt	the	process	of	implementing	the	reforms.	Without	the	data	
yielded	by	the	initial	changes,	they	stood	little	chance	of	defending	their	methods	if	the	
political	winds	shifted	against	them.	Scientific	management	necessitated	a	significant	
amount	of	data	collection,	sometimes	called	“red	tape”	by	its	advocates.389		Objections	to	
what	was	perceived	as	unjustified	experimentation	served	as	one	focal	point	for	resistance	
to	scientific	management.		
	 In	1909	storm	clouds	formed	on	the	horizon.	The	incoming	William	H.	Taft	
administration	appeared	more	sensitive	to	union	concerns	than	had	that	of	Theodore	
Roosevelt.		Evans’	window	of	opportunity	to	implement	scientific	management	at	Mare	
Island	Navy	yard	was	fast	closing.	Taft	wasted	little	time	in	replacing	Newberry	with	
George	von	Meyer	as	Secretary	of	the	Navy	in	March	1909.	Meyer’s	specific	feelings	toward	
scientific	management	remained	an	open	question,	much	debated,	in	the	first	few	weeks	
after	he	took	office.	However,	within	the	Navy	bureaucracy	resistance	was	growing	
noticeably	and	quickly.	Taylor	lamented	to	Evans,	some	three	weeks	after	Meyer’s	
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confirmation,	“it	seems	most	unfortunate	that	Newberry	was	not	allowed	to	continue	the	
fine	work	he	had	the	nerve	to	start.”390			
	 Taylor’s	fear	was	confirmed	when	he	received	a	letter	from	Evans	on	15	October,	
1909.	Scientific	management	had	not	progressed	fast	enough	in	the	navy	yards.		Union	and	
bureaucratic	opposition	combined	to	force	Evans	and	Taylor	on	the	defensive.	Meyer	
abandoned	Newberry’s	plans,	as	Taylor	predicted	because,	“results	had	not	been	obtained	
from	Mr.	Newberry’s	scheme.”391		The	initiative	authorized	by	Secretary	Newberry	ran	
from	February	to	July,	hardly	enough	time	to	fairly	adjudicate	a	method	so	complex	and	
encompassing.			The	sun	had	set	on	the	acceptance	of	scientific	management	by	the	United	
States	Navy—at	least	for	a	time.		
	 Evans	floundered	during	the	following	months.	Scientific	management	was	more	
than	a	system,	process,	or	method	to	him.	Despair	shadowed	everything,	as	his	deep	and	
abiding	belief,	purpose	in	life,	all	his	work	turned,	it	seemed,	to	ashes.	This	loss	was	made	
all	the	more	acute	because	what	had	happened	flew	in	the	face	of	logic.		Meyer’s	policy	
shifted	with	the	political	winds	of	labor	policy,	not	on	a	basis	of	efficiency	or	what	was	best	
for	the	Navy.		Shrewd	political	maneuvering	and	primal	emotions	drove	these	changes,	and	
to	a	logical	man	such	as	Evans,	emotions	and	politics	seemed	as	arbitrary	and	random	as	a	
hurricane	or	flood.	On	16	October,	Evans	confided	in	Taylor,	“…I	will	never	quit,	but	there	is	
no	use	of	expending	one’s	life	in	work	where	the	conditions	are	such	as	to	make	it	
impossible	to	produce	results.”392	One	of	the	official	explanations	proffered	by	the	Meyer	
administration	asserted…that	the	problem	of	handling	shops	of	Navy	Yard	is	a	military	
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rather	than	an	industrial	problem.”393		To	Evans	and	other	proponents	of	scientific	
management,	he	claim	was	as	thin	as	the	paper	it	was	written	on.				
	 However,	the	darkness	was	not	all	encompassing.		Assistant	Secretary	of	the	Navy	
Beekman	Winthrop	demonstrated	some	interest	in	scientific	management.394	His	support	
was	qualified	since,	as	Evans	wrote	Taylor,	“…he	wants	to	find	out	for	himself	the	best	
methods.”	Evans	primed	Taylor	to	expect	a	potential	telephone	call	from	Winthrop.395		
Meanwhile,	he	attempted	to	ameliorate	some	of	his	anxiety	through	prodigious	
correspondence,	firing	off	three	letters	to	Taylor	in	four	days.		On	15	October	1909,	Evans	
again	approached	Taylor	for	help.			For	Evans,	Taylor	represented	the	final	hope	to	
overcome	the	resistance,	the	last	reserve,	the	Old	Guard.	He	wagered	Taylor	leveraged	
against	Winthrop	could	place	scientific	management,	perhaps	under	a	different	guise,	back	
into	the	navy	yards.396			
	 In	the	interim,	Evans	published	an	article,	“Reduction	in	Cost	of	Navy	Yard	Work”	
that	captured	his	broader	thoughts	on	scientific	management	within	the	naval	
establishment.397	Evans	had	implemented	scientific	management,	at	least	in	part,	several	
years	before	Crozier.		Predictably,	his	attempts	generated	no	small	measure	of	discontent	
from	workers	and	presaged	similar	unhappiness	that	occurred	later	at	Watertown.	
However,	Evans	observed,“…another	difficulty	which	probably	every	manager	encounters	
when	he	attempt	to	introduce	some	radical	improvement,	that	is,	the	opposition	of	his	
workmen…probably	due	to	two	causes…	natural	conservatism	of	workmen…and	it	gave	the	
																																								 																				
393	Evans	to	Taylor,	October	15,	1909.	
394	H.A.	Evans	to	Frederick	Taylor,	October	12,	1909,	Box	116,	Frederick	Winslow	Taylor	Collection.	
395	Ibid.	
396	Evans	to	Taylor,	October	15,	1909.	
397	Holden	A.	Evans,	“Reduction	in	Cost	of	Navy	Yard	Work,”	American	Machinist	33,	no.	1	(1910):	3.	
	
	
155	
men	less	time	to	stand	around.”398		In	his	mind,	workers	disliked	progress	and	were	
inherently	lazy.	Now	he	discovered	the	politicians	played	the	part-	and	better.		
	 Evans	acknowledged	in	this	article	that,	“…our	navy	yards	have	a	poor	reputation	
among	business	men	and	managers”	in	regards	to	efficiency.399			He	stressed	that,	the	
complex	nature	of	work	at	the	navy	yards	militated	against	any	easy	fixes.	Only	the	
application	of	Frederick	Taylor’s	theories	would	correct	the	problems.	
It	is	clear	that	Taylor’s	influence	continued	to	spread	throughout	the	constructor	corps.400	
Name	recognition	of	Taylor	and	Taylorism	fueled	both	the	spread	and	opposition	to	his	
methods.	His	work	Shop	Management,	published	nearly	seven	years	before,	gained	
considerable	traction	by	1910.	The	term	scientific	management,	not	coined	until	1910	and	
not	by	Taylor,	implicitly	conveyed	the	idea	of	factual,	eternal	and	universally	applicable	
laws	to	increase	efficiency.	Men	since	the	age	of	Aristotle	had	looked	for	the	magic	key	to	
unlock	the	mystery	of	creation	and	Taylor,	as	it	pertained	to	efficiency,	appeared	to	have	
found	the	answer.		
	 Evans	remained	steadfast	in	his	faith.			Unwilling	to	bend	or	rescind	his	methods,	his	
days	at	Mare	Island	were	numbered.			The	Navy,	by	the	middle	of	1910,	reassigned	Evans	
from	the	Mare	Island	Navy	Yard.401	There	was	no	need	to	speculate	as	to	the	cause	of	his	
removal.	Nevertheless,	the	seeds	of	a	powerful	idea	had	taken	root.		Evans’s	“detachment”	
did	not	necessarily	reduce	his	influence.		Those	who	had	not,	by	mere	proximity,	stumbled	
onto	Taylor’s	methods	were	led	there	by	men	like	Evans.	
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	 For	example,	in	1910	Evans	introduced	Navy	constructor	A.G.	Coburn	to	Taylor.402		
Following	their	initial	meeting,	Coburn	requested	pamphlets,	much	as	Evans	had	back	in	
1906.403		Taylor’s	charm	was	evident	here	as	well.		Coburn	noted,	“…I	feel	the	need	of	a	first	
hand	inspiration	to	keep	me	going	for	a	while	under	the	conditions	which	as	you	know	are	
extremely	uncomfortable.”404	Taylor	promptly	responded	on	22	September	writing:		“…It	
would	give	me	very	great	pleasure	to	have	you	come	to	my	house,”	Taylor	wrote,	“at	any	
time	when	you	are	in	the	neighborhood…”405		
		 Furthermore,	Taylor	suggested	that	Coburn	go	to	the	Army’s	Watertown	Arsenal	
and	observe	the	system	in	action.		On	Taylor’s	recommendation,	Carl	Barth	had	worked	
there	with	Crozier	to	implement	scientific	management.406	Taylor	thus	acted	as	a	conduit	to	
route	a	naval	officer	to	an	Army	armory.		Presumably,	the	informed	naval	officer,	having	
observed	scientific	management	in	practice	at	an	armory	sanctioned	by	the	government,	
and	then	returned	to	a	naval	yard	to	enact	it,	a	form	of	intellectual	cross-pollination.		In	
early	October	Coburn	briefly	stayed	with	Taylor	at	his	home.407		
	 With	time	on	his	hands	after	his	departure	from	Mare	Island,	Evans	requested	
extended	leave	for	advanced	study	under	Taylor	in	scientific	management.	The	request,	
despite	a	positive	referral	from	Admiral	Richard	M.	Watt,	was	denied.408		The	atmosphere	
had	shifted	decisively	against	scientific	management,	at	least	the	kind	advocated	by	Evans.		
Taylor	wrote	to	Watt	regarding	what	he	termed	the	incoherence	of	the	Taft	administration.			
“It	is,	however,	extraordinary”,	Taylor	observed,	“	when	one	realized	that	the	same	
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methods	which	are	so	severely	condemned	and	which	are	being,	“…torn	out	of	the	navy	
yards,	are	being	introduced	by	General	Crozier	at	Watertown	with	great	rapidity	and	in	the	
most	thorough	manner.”409	Taylor	found	that	the	Army	armories	proved	a	strong	bulwark	
against	hostility	of	politicians.	
	 Taylor	informed	Watt	that	Crozier	planned	a	meeting	in	early	1912	of	the	
commanders	of	all	arsenals	for	the	purpose	of	“introducing	the	same	methods.”410		If	
Secretary	Meyer	wanted	a	“thoroughly	impartial”	witness	as	to	the	viability	of	scientific	
management,	Taylor	argued,	Crozier	fit	the	bill.411	Failing	that,	Taylor	sought	a	meeting	
with	President	Taft.412	Unfortunately,	as	Taylor	recalled,	the	meeting	lasted	less	than	a	
minute.413	In	that	span	the	president	demonstrated	little	interest	in	scientific	management	
or	the	Evans	“matter.”		The	president	bluntly	stated,	“…he	of	course	could	not	have	much	
interest	in	a	system	which	was	in	opposition	to	the	view	of	the	Secretary	of	the	Navy.”414	
Thus,	the	roadblock	to	acceptance	of	scientific	management	appeared	to	be,	at	least	
officially,	Secretary	of	the	Navy	Meyer.		
	 The	treatment	of	Evans	caused	a	high	degree	of	resentment	among	fellow	naval	
constructors.	Coburn	called	the	administration	“shortsighted”	and	“bigoted”	in	its	
treatment	of	Evans’	“case.”415		However,	like	Evans,	Coburn	expected	little	sympathy	for	
Taylor’s	methods	at	his	new	duty	station.		Indeed,	Taylor	warned	his	protégée	with	a	touch	
of	sarcasm:		“You	will	not…find	the	commanding	officer…	at	League	Island	in	great	
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sympathy	with	anything	which	involved	progress.”416		Taylor	knew	this	because	he	resided	
not	far	from	the	League	Island	facility.		Perhaps	the	only	benefit	of	the	new	assignment	was	
Taylor	and	Coburn	would	now	see	a	great	deal	more	of	each	other.		 	
	 Most	of	Taylor’s	naval	contacts	resided	in	the	constructor	corps	amongst	engineers	
and	those	in	the	navy	yards,	Goodrich	being	an	obvious	exception.		However,	one	other	
source	of	support	emerged—from	a	line	officer.		Taylor	received	an	intriguing	letter	from	
Lieutenant	W.B.	Tardy	on	6	February	1911.		Tardy,	a	student	of	scientific	management,	
inquired	of	Taylor	whether	an	engineering	section	on	board	a	ship	might	benefit	
significantly	from	such	an	organization.417	Tardy	noted,	that	if	correct,	delineating	the	time	
it	took	to	do	each	job	allowed	for	multiple	improvements	and	increased	efficiency	aboard	
the	battleship.		With	this	action,	scientific	management	expanded	from	shore	to	ship.		The	
tasks	were	similar,	but	the	context	had	changed.		
	 A	peculiar	situation	existed	in	the	period	before	World	War	I.			Meyer	persistently	
touted	the	failures	of	scientific	management,	and	naval	officers,	especially	constructors,	
continued	to	implement	it.418	It	is	difficult	to	gauge	the	prevalence	or	popularity	of	Taylor’s	
methods	in	the	Navy	at	this	time.	Suffice	it	to	say	that	Meyer’s	vocal	opposition	provided	a	
valuable	benchmark.		Meyer	was	not	totally	opposed	to	the	methods	of	scientific	
management,	but	he	was	opposed	to	anything	that	had	Taylor’s	name	stamped	on	it.		
Where	Taylor’s	name	popped	up,		storms	followed.		Taylor	himself	recognized	that	he	was	
toxic.		In	a	letter	of	11	February	1911,	he	warned	Tardy,	“…I	feel	you	will	be	more	likely	to	
succeed	by	calling	your	system	‘scientific	management’	rather	than	branding	it	as	the	
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Taylor	system.”419	General	Crozier	was	aware	of	this	sentiment	as	well,	but	thought	Taylor	
deserved	the	name	and	the	fruits	of	his	labor.420			
	 Whatever	Meyer’s	motivations	and	the	political	intrigue	involved,	in	March	1911,	he	
instructed	Captain	Andrews	to	invite	Taylor,	as	the	Secretary’s	guest,	to	come	aboard	the	
U.S.S.	Dolphin.	From	there	the	two	would	move	to	view	naval	gunnery	in	action	on	the	U.S.S	
Vermont.421		Tardy	also	briefly	spoke	with	Meyer	who,	“sincerely	hopes	he	[Taylor]	will	
accept”	the	invitation	and	for	Tardy	to	ensure	that	he	did.422	This	provided	the	two	men	
ample	time	to	discuss	the	merits	of	scientific	management.	From	the	moment	he	was	sworn	
in	Meyer	had	crushed	every	sign	of	Taylorism	in	the	Navy,	including	reassignment	of	
officers,	like	Evans,	who	got	in	his	way.	Now,	it	appeared,	the	invitation	to	Taylor,	the	
embodiment	of	the	movement,	to	dine	aboard	ship	suggested	that	Meyer’s	tune	had	
changed.	But	every	song	comes	to	an	end.		
	 In	a	brazen	breach	of	decorum	Tardy	implored	Taylor	to	accept	the	Secretary’s	
invitation.423		If	Taylor’s	record	was	any	indication,	he	needed	little	prompting	to	accept	
Meyer’s	offer.		Dismissed	by	Meyer	and	deflected	by	Taft	in	1909,	Taylor	now	sensed	a	
breach	in	the	political	barricade.		With	the	characteristic	conviction	of	a	true	believer,	he	
charged	in.				Tardy	played	a	dangerous	game	by		dancing	on	the	boundary	line	of	collusion.		
However,	Taylor	and	Tardy	were	family	friends	and	their	relationship,	akin	to	that	with	
Goodrich,	provided	Taylor	with	an	inside	seat.		
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	 Meyer’s	move	toward	scientific	management	caused	a	corresponding	shift	in	the	
Navy.		Officers	and	agents	of	scientific	management	now	began	to	move	out	of	the	shadows.		
A	jubilant	Tardy	observed	to	Taylor,	“it	looks	to	me,	from	what	is	apparent	and	what	I	get	
behind	the	scenes	that	the	time	is	ripe	for	you	to	add	the	Navy	scalp	to	your	belt.”424	If	
Evans’s	career	had	suffered	because	of	his	belief	in	scientific	management,	Tardy	sought	to	
profit	by	the	association	with	Taylor.	Furthermore,	Tardy’	s	proximity	to	the	Secretary	
provided	him	with	confidential	information	about	Meyer’s	naval	plans	that	he	shared	with	
Taylor.425		
	 In	a	hand	written	letter	of	27	March	1911,	after	a	friendly	preamble,	Tardy	spelled	
out	his	plan.			“My	reasons	for	sending	you	a	manuscript	letter”,	Tardy	explained,	“instead	
of	a	typewritten	one	is	because	I	am	going	to	say	things	that	I	don’t	want	a	yeoman	or	clerk	
to	see.”426	He	no	longer	was	dancing	along	the	line	of	collusion;	he	clearly	had	chosen	to	
erase	it.		Tardy	described	his	plans	in	detail	to	Taylor:	
…why	I	am	so	anxious	to	have	you	accept.	Now	for	a	little	more	prospective	history,	
which	will	unfold	other	personal	reasons	why	it	is	necessary	to	my	career	almost	
that	you	come.	I	am	given	to	understand	that	I	am	to	become	a	member	of	the	board	
of	officers	who	are	to	visit	scientific	[management]	shops.		That	if	I	make	good	in	
that	capacity	I	am	to	become	the	Secretary’s	aid	for	Navy	yard	organization	and	
management.	I	believe	I	have	a	pretty	clear	concept	of	all	the	underlying	principles	
of	the	Taylor	system		of	management	and	I	know	that	I	am	in	full	sympathy	with	
you…now	is	the	critical	opportune	moment	for	you	to	advance	your	religion	of	
management		by	adding	the	Navy	to	the	numbers	of	organizations	that	are	operating	
under		Taylor	system	of	management.	You	can	help	me	in	my	ambition	to	be		 of	
value	to	the	service	and	to	render	you	loyal	assistance	in	reorganizing		Navy	Yards.		
You	see	if	I	am	the	officer	designated	to	work	with	your		representative	and	to	see	
that	each	yard	advances	as	rapidly	and	as		uniformly	as	possibly	you	not	only	do	not	
have	a	reactionary	in	me,	but	you		 have	an	enthusiastic	disciple	who	will	avail	
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himself	of	all	the	counsel	you	may		 care	to	give…please	regard	the	above	as	
confidential	for	the	present.427		
	
	 Taylor	happily	accepted	the	Secretary’s	invitation	on	30	March,	1911.428	No	longer	
the	pariah,	fortune	again	smiled	on	his	endeavors.	The	naval	exercise	was	a	success	for	all	
interested	parties.	Taylor	felt	liberated,	if	not	vindicated.	Tardy	received	the	support	he	
needed	and	the	affirmation	of	the	Secretary.	And	Meyer	was	now	informed	on	the	matter	of	
scientific	management.		Taylor,	confided	in	Admiral	Watt,	“I	devoted	all	of	my	time	with	Mr.	
Meyer	to	this	end…”429		
	 Tardy	wrote	Taylor	on	11	April	to	inform	him	that,	as	predicted,	he	had	been	
appointed	to	a	board	assigned	to	investigate	scientific	management	at	various	shops.430	
Tardy	suggested	to	Secretary	Meyer	that	Evans	be	appointed	to	the	board	because	of	his	
expertise	in	scientific	management.	Taylor,	likewise,	defended	Evans	at	length	while	
aboard	the	Dolphin	and	Vermont	in	the	hope	of	mending	the	rupture	between	the	two	
men.431		The	Secretary	took	the	request	under	advisement.		Tardy	informed	Taylor	that		
“the	Secretary	authorized	me	to	tell	you	[Taylor]	in	confidence	that	he	had	take	up	with	
Watt	the	question	of	appointing	Evans	to	this	Board,	and	that	Watt	thought	Evans	lacked	
judicial	balance…”432				
	 But	matters	were	not	as	they	seemed.	Taylor	promptly	responded	in	a	missive,	on	
April	13,	to	Tardy.		According	to	Taylor,	Watt	remembered	the	conversation	quite	
differently.	“Watt	told	me	he	strongly	recommended	Evans	as	a	member	of	this	Board,”	
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Taylor	recounted,	“and	stated	that	he	was	better	qualified	than	anyone	else	in	the	
Construction	Corps…		The	Secretary	refused	to	have	Evans	because	he	claimed	Evans	had	
attacked	him	in	the	press.”433	Given	the	recommendation	by	Watt	that	Evans	be	allowed	to	
take	a	year	of	leave	to	study	under	Taylor,	the	Secretary’s	assertion	appeared	questionable.		
The	rupture	remained,	and	experienced	U.S.	Navy	constructor,	G.H.	Rock,	and	Charles	
Conrad	Paymaster	of	the	Navy,	were	named	the	other	members	of	the	Board.		
	 Taylor’s	complex	management	methods	required	significant	training	and	education.	
Without	proper	training,	scientific	management	appeared	burdensome	to	the	uninformed.	
Copious	records	and	detailed	processes	seemed	unnecessary,	and	for	the	worker	the	
requirement	for	rigorous	repetition	caused	frustration	and	anger.		Taylor	feared	that,	
lacking	extensive	education	about	methods,		the	board	members	would	view	scientific	
management	“…as	embodying	a	vast	amount	of	red	tape,	the	real	meaning	of	which	they	
would	in	no	way	appreciate.”434	To	forestall	any	such	judgment,	Taylor	hosted	the	board,	at	
his	home	in	late	April,	1911.435		Its	members	made	clear	their	commitment	to	impartiality	
and	objectivity,	and	assured	Taylor	that	he	had	nothing	to	fear	from	the	board.	The	threat	
emerged	from	another	quarter.		
	 By	August	1911	Taylor	had	defeated	or	outmaneuvered	those	who	opposed	
implementation	of	scientific	management	in	government	workshops.	Tardy	was	poised	to	
introduce	scientific	management	on	a	larger	scale.	And,	surprisingly,	Meyer	relented	and	
allowed	Evans	to	join	the	board.436	Evans	also	became	a	member	of	Admiral	Charles	E.	
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Vreeland’s	commission,	which	was	also	working	on	modern	management	for	Navy	
Yards.437	In	principle,	the	Navy	accepted	scientific	management	as	offering	superior	
methods	that	if	employed	improved	efficiency.	Officers	agreed	on	that	much.	Now	the	
question	revolved	around	the	details	of	what	would	be	done.	Taylor	assumed,	as	late	as	27	
August,	that	Meyer’s	introduction	of	scientific	management	was	only	a	matter	of	time.438	
	 On	12	October	Taylor	received	a	shocking	letter	from	G.S.	Radford,	inclosing		a	
newspaper	clipping	from	the	Washington	Post.	The	article,	“Will	Try	New	Navy	Plan:	Sec	
Meyer	to	Import	English	System,”	indicated	the	possibility	of	Meyer	moving	in	a	different	
direction	than	he	had	intimated	to	Taylor.439		
	 	 Washington,	Oct	8—Casting	aside	all	scientific	systems	of	Navy	Yard	
	 management	advocated	in	this	country,	because	he	believes	they	involve	too		much	
detail	and	require	serious	changes	to	the	Civil	Service	rules	of		 employment,	Sec	of	the	
Navy	Meyer	will	import	from	England	the	system	of		 management	in	use	by	Vickers,	
Limited…Every	one	in	the	Navy,	it	is	said,		except	possibly	some	radical	bureau	or	corps	
partisans,	will	welcome	a		 system	whereby	the	commandant	will	again	be	the	chief	of	all	
matters	at	a		 Navy	Yard.440		
	 Meyer	had	once	again	changed	his	mind.	He	appeared	to	be	steering	by	sail	rather	
than	rudder.		Like	most	bureaucrats	of	the	time,	he	appeared	to	be	guided	by	the	political	
winds.		The	American	Machinist	captured	the	confusion	in	a	11	April,	1912	article,	“The	
Vickers	System	of	Management.”			The	piece	stated:	“Engineers	and	machinery	builders	in	
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America	were	considerably	surprised	a	few	months	ago	to	learn	that	Secretary	of	the	Navy	
Meyer	had	decided	against	all	of	the	systems	of	shop	management	in	use	in	this	country	
and	determined	to	install	the	Vickers	system	of	management	from	the	great	British.”441		
The	dramatic	shift	in	policy	caught	civilian	and	public	engineers	by	surprise.		
	 		It	is	noteworthy	that	Meyer	did	not	entirely	torpedo	the	idea	of	scientific	
management.	Instead,	he	separated	the	concept	from	its	creator.	Anything	attached	to	
Taylor’s	name,	in	any	form,	became	flotsam	and	was	jettisoned	overboard.			Needing	a	
substitute	for	Taylorism,	Secretary	Meyer	dispatched	two	captains	observe	English	
production	methods	at	Vickers,	the	giant	manufacturing	company	producing	every	thing	
from	steel	castings	to	machine	guns.		Neither	of	the	officers	had	any	experience	in	scientific	
management.442			Taylor	cynically	remarked	to	Radford	that	their	trip	will	“no	doubt…	be	a	
great	success.”443		Notably,	their	trip	to	inspect	the	Vickers	factory	lasted	a	mere	two	
weeks.	
	 Secretary	Meyer	in	the	1911	Annual	Report	of	the	Navy	Department	stated:	
	 I	found	in	England,	at	the	works	of	Messrs.	Vickers	(Ltd.),	at	Barrow-	 in-Furness,	a	
most	efficient	simple	system	of	management.		Briefly,	it	may	be	said	that	this	
establishment	has	an	engineering	department	and	a	shipyard	department,	with	an	
electrical	division	under	the	engine	department.	They	arrange,	in	the	larger	jobs,	for	
the	orderly	passage	of	the	separate	parts	from	one	shop	to	another,	instruct	the	
workmen	how	to	work	most	efficiently,	and	follow	the	separate	operations,	by	
means	of	a	corps	of	skilled	progress	men,	until	the	assembly	is	completed.	In	a	
general	way	the	work	is	thoroughly	systematized	on	common-sense	principles,	but	
no	attempt	is	made	to	go	into	the	forecasting	of	minute	details.	In	consequence	the	
extra	cost	of	elaborate	planning	is	avoided.		The	greatest	percentage	of	increased	
efficiency	seems	to	have	been	attained	by	broad	effects	in	systematization	and	in	
securing	the	cheerful	cooperation	of	the	workmen	toward	best	results	through	
proper	recognition	of	their	initiative	and	more	efficient	effort.	The	management	at	
Vickers	is	thoroughly	convinced	that	excessive	prevision	of	detail	does	not	pay.		The	
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company	is	confirmed	its	experience	at	one	of	its	own	plants,	at	Erith,	England,	
where	for	between	three	and	four	years	there	had	been	installed	one	of	the	most	
elaborate	of	the	scientific	management	systems	with	unsatisfactory	results.444		
	
	 Meyer’s	motivations	were	questionable	as	they	related	to	scientific	management.	
Perhaps	Taylor’s	system	did	require	too	much	paper	work.	Taylor	himself	noted	that	
without	adequate	training	novices	failed	to	grasp	the	importance	of	detailed	
quantification.445	However,	Meyer	also	wanted	a	system	that	did	not	require	years	of	
training	and	education	to	be	employed.	Taylorism	in	that	respect	failed	to	meet	a	key	
threshold.		
	 Meyer,	along	with	the	heads	of	other	governmental	entities,	created	multiple	boards	
to	study	Taylorism.	The	completed	reports	generally	concurred	that	the	Navy	Yards	
required	organizational	and	management	changes.	Taylor’s	vast	network	of	disciples	
always	seemed	to	find	their	way	onto	these	committees.		Names	like	Henry	L.	Gantt,	
Harrington	Emerson,	Hollis	Godfrey	and	Charles	Day	populate	the	literature	on	scientific	
management.	After	all,	they	were	the	efficiency	experts.	Their	conclusions	were	what	one	
might	expect	from	a	group	of	men	associated	with	Taylor.446	
	 Nevertheless,	Meyer’s	opposition	focused	on	Taylor	himself.		A	system	by	another	
name	such	as	provided	by	the	Vickers	investigation	provided	Meyer	with	the	pretense	he	
needed.		H.	F.	Wright,	a	naval	constructor,	noted	to	Taylor	on	9	November	1911,	“I	am	more	
than	ever	convinced	that	the	intention	of	those	in	authority	is	to	institute	scientific	
management	as	understood	by	you	and	to	call	it	by	another	name.”447		Taylor	replied	on	the	
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13	November,	“	he	would	like	to	get	any	benefits	that	would	come	from	the	principles	of	
scientific	management,	but	would	prefer	branding	them	as	the	Meyer	System	rather	
anything	else.”448	Taylor	knew	his	name	evoked	resistance.		However,	the	animosity	
between	Taylor	and	Meyer	had	become	personal.	Taylor	felt	betrayed	by	Meyer	after	his	
overtly	friendly	gesture	six	months	earlier.		
	 One	day	later,	Taylor	disclosed	to	Coburn	that	the	Army’s	leadership	provided	solid	
support	for	scientific	management.			He	drew	strength	from	this	success	and	reflected	on	it	
during	times	of	trouble.		The	Secretary	of	War	and	General	Crozier	were	outspoken	
supporters	of	Taylorism.449	Crozier	testified	multiple	times	before	congressional	
committees	always	to	the	benefit	of	Taylor.			Taylor	assisted	Crozier	with	material	support	
for	the	hearings	before	congress.	Furthermore,	Taylor	claimed	to	know	how	to	manage	
disgruntled	workers,	since	his	methods	tended	to	create	them.	He	passed	on	suggestions	to	
both	Crozier	and	Coburn	about	that	subject.450		
	 The	Army	&	Navy	Journal	ran	a	small	piece	on	16	December	1911	highlighting	the	
increased	cost	of	repair,	over	10%,	between	1910	and	1911.451	It	was	an	oblique	shot	at	
Meyer.		Taylor	confided	in	Coburn,	“…this	might	be	unpalatable	reading	to	Secretary	
Meyer…	Rather	unexpected	[as]	I	had	the	impression	that	they	[Army	&	Navy	Journal]	were	
very	strict	partisans	of	the	line.”452	The	journal	was	quite	popular	with	officers	during	this	
period.		The	Meyer’s	administration	was	now	coming	under	fire	multiple	directions.			The	
Constructor	Corps,	under	Meyer’s	jurisdiction,	continued	to	execute	time	and	motion	
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studies	along,	albeit	covertly,	with	various	other	elements	of	scientific	management.453		
Internal	frustration	and	loathing	began	to	boil	over.		
	 It	appeared	Meyer’s	rapidly	evolving	management	plans	might	cost	the	Navy	one	of	
its	brightest	officers.	On	November	19,	Tardy	informed	Taylor	that	he	had		“…heard	vague	
rumors	that	Evans	is	going	to	resign	soon.”454	In	fact,	it	was	not	a	rumor.	Evans	had	no	
intention	of	wasting	his	life	in	pursuit	of	a	worthy	ideal	that	the	Navy	refused	to	embrace.	
Meyer	had	changed	his	position	for	a	third	time	regarding	scientific	management.	Evans,	
emotionally	exhausted,	was	done	with	it	all.455		
	 Tardy’	s	intentionally	belated	letter	provided	Taylor	with	some	insight	into	the	Navy	
workings.		The	delayed	response	allowed	events	to	mature,	which	afforded	Tardy	two	
revealing	observations.	First,	the	Navy	leadership	took	“flight”	at	the	“first”	signs	of	trouble	
from	organized	labor.		In	principle,	the	Navy	accepted	the	need	for	putting	into	effect	
scientific	management.		In	practice,	politicians	and	organized	labor	opposed	the	plan.	
Second,	Tardy	contended,	“I	do	not	believe	for	a	moment	that	any	effort	is	to	be	made	to	
adopt	Vickers	management	for	the	yards.”			Secretary	Meyer	was	playing	a	shell	game	and	
one	everyone	appeared	to	recognize.		“As	I	understand,	whatever	efficiency	there	may	be	in	
that	system”,	Tardy	explained,	“is	due	to	piece	work	and	the	premium	system.”456		In	short,	
the	credit	belonged	to	Taylor	but	he	was	not	going	to	get	it.		
	 Despite	interference	by	Meyer’s	administration,	naval	officers	continued	to	
implement	scientific	management	in	its	various	incarnations.457			Line	officers,	especially	
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those	aboard	larger	ships,	used	it	to	refine	and	hone	sailor’s	actions.	Those	at	shore	used	it	
to	reduce	cost	and	time	involved	in	repairs	and	production.458		
	 With	unabashed	advocacy,	Crozier	enumerated	the	benefits	and	value	of	scientific	
management	at	Army	armories.		He	told	the	Secretary	of	War	and	Congress	on	multiple	
occasions	that	Taylor’s	methods	delivered	a	superior	product	below	traditional	cost	and	at	
a	faster	rate.459		Navy	Constructor	Corps	officers	drew	strength	from	the	Army’s	success.	
Rationally	it	seemed	that	if	the	government	approved	the	process	in	one	area	that	it	ought	
to	be	applicable	in	another.		The	conclusion	was	that	if	they	weathered	Meyer’s	attempts	to	
disassemble	regarding	scientific	management	the	next	administration	might	be	amenable	
to	the	system.460		
	 The	approaching	end	of	Meyer’s	term	could	not	come	fast	enough	for	Taylor	and	his	
followers.		If	the	night	is	darkest	and	the	cold	most	penetrating	just	before	dawn,	Meyer’s	
administration	played	its	part	well,	exploiting	Taylorism	at	its	most	vulnerable	point.		
Nothing	drove	Taylor	into	a	defensive	fury	like	a	potential	strike.	It	threatened	everything	
he	worked	for	over	the	last	twenty	years.		Turmoil	menaced	social	stability.			Politicians	and	
employers	could	not	abide	organized	worker	opposition,	at	least	for	long.					
	 On	1	January	1912,	while	most	men	recovered	from	the	night	before,	Taylor	
feverishly	fired	off	four	letters.		Taylor’s	correspondence	with	over	a	dozen	naval	officers	
spanned	over	fifteen	years	and	the	correspondence	quantitatively	measured	hundreds	of	
pages.	On	no	other	day	did	Taylor	fire	off	four	letters	to	naval	officers,	employing	nearly	
verbatim	language.	Thematically,	they	were	identical.			Taylor	expressed	his	views	to	the	
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recipients,	Rock,	Wright,	Coburn,	and	James	Reed,	regarding	the	protests	taking	place	at	the	
Boston	Navy	yard	and	potentially	other	facilities.461			
	 The	special	congressional	committee	assigned	to	evaluate	scientific	management,	
which	examined	Army	arsenals	and	Navy	yards,	was	nearing	the	end	of	its	investigation,	
scheduled	to	conclude	on	11	February,	1912.462		With	one	month	remaining,	Taylor	needed	
to	demonstrate	concrete	examples	of	“loafing”	at	navy	yards.		He	used	the	term	“loafing”	
(and	on	other	occasions,	“soldiering”)	to	describe	employees	working	at	minimum	capacity.	
Taylor	inquired	whether	any	of	the	officers	might	have	such	examples,	preferring	one	in	
any	about	which	a	foreman	might	be	willing	to	testify	before	the	committee.		
	 	Taylor	told	Coburn	that	if	he	were	willing	to	testify	before	the	committee,	he	would	
pay	for	all	expenses	incurred.463		Coburn	agreed	to	Taylor’s	request.	However,		Taylor	
subsequently	learned	that		“the	committee	is	not	issuing	subpoenas	for	people	to	appear	
before	it,	but	I	have	no	doubt	that	I	can	get	them	to	write	you,	requesting	that	you	appear	
before	them.”464		In	a	letter	of	January	12,	Taylor	informed	Coburn:	“I	shall	send	your	name	
to	Mr.	Wilson,	the	Chairman	of	the	House	Committee	to	Investigate	the	Taylor	and	other	
Systems	of	Management,	and	ask	him	to	have	you	subpoenaed…”	Over	the	years	Taylor	had	
developed	an	extensive	and	influential	network	that	enabled	him,	at	a	minimum,	to	gain	an	
audience	with	just	about	any	politician.		
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	 On	January	19,	1912,	Taylor	wrote	to	Tardy,	observing:	“A	good	many	witnesses	
have	appeared	before	the	Committee	from	the	Boston	yard	and	some	from	the	New	York	
yard,	and	the	impression	left	upon	the	Committee	by	these	men	is	that	they	are	pretty	
badly	treated	in	the	navy	yards…and…that	if	the	Taylor	System	were	to	be	introduced	they	
would	be	driven	to	death.”465	Taylor	had	a	flair	for	caricature	and	his	most	frequent	target,	
rivaled	only	by	Meyer,	was	the	common	day	worker.		His	experience	as	a	young	man	and	
then	as	a	contractor	had	fueled	him	with	a	particular	disdain	toward	wage	earners.	Implicit	
in	the	piece-rate	and	premium	system	was	the	belief	that	day	workers	were	not	working	to	
their	full	potential.	Thus,	Taylor’s	system	involved	identification	of	the	shirkers	and	
achieved	efficiency	by	rewarding	those	that	exceeded	the	standard	while	those	that	did	not	
received	less	pay.		Unions	and	employees	perceived	the	system	as	punitive.		The	enemy	of	
every	union	system	is	the	“rate	breaker”	who	sets	a	seemingly-unfair	standard	for	
comparison	to	other	workers	performing	similar	tasks.	
	 Taylor’s	letter	to	Tardy	continued	with	the	warning	that“…if	they	[the	committee]	
were	to	recommend	against	time	study	it	would	become	practically	impossible	in	many	
cases	to	get	a	fair	day’s	work	out	of	the	workmen.”466		His	true	feelings	on	these	matters	
occasionally	populated	letters	to	his	closest	friends.	He	repeatedly	claimed	that	scientific	
management	assisted	workers	in	reaching	their	full	potential	while	his	personal	letters	
betrayed	a	different	perspective.		Towards	the	end	of	the	missive,	Taylor	entreated	Tardy	
to	appear	before	the	committee	as	well.	Taylor	played	every	card	he	possessed.		In	Tardy,	
Taylor	found	a	man	of	like	mind.	On	January	26th	Tardy	replied,	“I	firmly	believe	that	we	
must	come	to	scientific	time	studies	and	bonus	or	premium	system	of	wages	if	we	are	to	
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hope	for	even	fair	results.”467		Taylor	hoped	with	a	critical	mass	of	naval	officers	before	the	
committee	he	might	trump	the	voices	of	workers.	
	 After	Taylor	testified	before	the	Committee,	he	dispatched	a	letter	to	Tardy,	on	
February	2,	which	revealed	his	personal	thoughts		about	the	Secretary	of	Navy.			
In	Taylor’s	opinion:	
…the	Secretary	of	the	Navy	had	announced	in	the	most	emphatic	manner	that	he	did	
not	intend	and	never	had	intended	introducing	any	element	of	scientific	
management	into	the	Navy,		that	he	was	about	to	introduce	the	Vickers	system…that	
scientific	management	had	been	used	in	one	of	the	Vickers	shops	in	England	for	
years,	and	had	resulted	in	loss	of	money	to	the	Vickers	Company,	and	that	the	when	
the	real	Vickers	system	was	substituted	in	its	place	this	Department,	which	formerly	
operated	at	a	loss,	at	once	operated	at	a	very	large	profit.468			
	
	 Meyer	used	his	position	to	broadcast	his	damaging	views	on	scientific	management	
to	the	public	and	the	Navy.	He	adopted	a	populist	stance,	as	had	President	Taft,	that	there	
was	little	need	for	specialists	in	Army	and	Navy	facilities.			The	common	man	was	just	as	
capable	as	the	educated	professional.	Naval	officers	demurred.469		However,	while	Meyer	
still	occupied	the	pulpit,	Taylorism	was	the	rising	religion.		
	 David	Watson	Taylor	had	served	as	a	naval	constructor	from	1892	to1894	at	Mare	
Island	Navy	Yard.470	Taylor	eventually	attained	the	rank	of	admiral	and,	“for	about	eight	
years	from	1914	to	1922…served	as	the	Chief	Constructor	and	Chief	of	Bureau	of	
Construction	and	Repair.”471		On	February	2,	1912,	two	years	before	he	attained	the	rank	of	
Admiral,	constructor	Taylor	dispatched	a	letter	to	Frederick	Taylor	detailing	his	testimony	
before	the	committee.	The	testimony	(for	which	he	seemed	particularly	proud)	strongly	
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supported	scientific	management.	Constructor	Taylor	described	it	as,	“…the	great	mental	
revolution	which	takes	place	under	scientific	management,	and	which	is	its	essential	feature	
[my	emphasis].”472		
	 Furthermore,	constructor	Taylor	informed	his	mentor	that	he	had	encountered	a	
particularly	beneficial	individual	in	Washington,	D.C.,	who	helped	prepare	“all	witnesses	
who	appear	for	our	side”,	Mr.	Hollis	Godfrey.		As	identified	by	authors	of	a	study	of	shop	
management	methods,	Godfrey	was	a,		“consulting	engineer,	associated	with	Mr.	Frederick	
Winslow	Taylor.”473		Four	years	later	Woodrow	Wilson	was	to	appoint	Godfrey	to	the	
Advisory	Commission	of	Council	of	National	Defense	in,	an	oversight	organization	created	
to	efficiently	focus	and	manage	the	nation’s	resources	in	preparedness	efforts	for	WWI.474		
	 Only	two	letters	between	D.W.	Taylor	and	F.W.	Taylor	have	been	found.			However,	
the	tenor	and	conversant	language	displayed	in	these	missives	argues	for	a	familiarity	only	
acquired	through	frequent	communication.	This	relationship	no	doubt	paid	dividends	later.	
D.W.	Taylor’s	influence	as	Chief	Constructor	allowed	him	to	put	into	effect	scientific	
management	in	the	Navy	Yards	throughout	the	war.		D.W.	Taylor	worked	closely	with	F.W.	
Taylor	to	prepare	naval	constructors	for	testimony	before	the	congressional	committee.		
The	preparation	would	allow	constructors	to	highlight	the	positive	elements	of	scientific	
management	and	avoid	“embarrassing”	moments.475		
	 The	Committee’s	report	found	no	damning	evidence	against	Taylor	or	any	other	
system	of	management.	Despite	Orwellian-like	predictions,	the	Committee	uncovered	little	
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to	support	the	notion	that	scientific	management	created	draconian-like	environments.476	
Taylor	had	deftly	dodged	the	coup	de	grace	intended	by	the	shipyard	unions.			
	 Nevertheless,	Taylor	received	a	shot	across	the	bow	from	an	unexpected	direction.	
On	20	June	1912,	Taylor	received	a	letter	from	T.	G.	Roberts,	a	naval	constructor.	Roberts	
detailed	two	intriguing	ideas.	First,	“some	of	my	colleagues	who	have	been	associated	with	
Evans,	and	are	in	touch,	told	me	that	the	system	installed	at	the	Vickers	works	was	
introduced	there	by	someone	who	got	it	from	someone	back	in	America…”		The	allegations	
proved	to	be	true.		In	a	missive	to	Roberts,	Taylor	acknowledged	that	Vickers	did	in	fact	
send	over	several	men	in	1900	for	three	weeks	to	the	Bethlehem	works.		According	to	
Taylor,	while	there	the	men	“…learned	as	much	as	they	could	about	our	system	in	that	time,	
but	that	was	mighty	little…”477	Frederick	W.	Taylor	had	an	inventor’s	disdain	for	imitations	
and	those	associated	with	it.		However,		Roberts	also	provided	detailed	information	on	a	
newly	published	attack	on	Taylorism.		
Admiral	John	R.	Edwards	penned	a	scathing	critique	of	scientific	management	in	the	
journal	of	the	American	Society	of	Naval	Engineers	in	May,	1912.478		Edwards	asserted	that	
“…management	is	an	art	not	a	science,	that	the	Taylor	System	antagonizes	the	workmen	
and	neglects	the	personal	equation…”479		A	graduate	of	the	U.S.	Naval	Academy	and	an	
engineer,	Edwards,	according	to	his	official	biography,	“…transferred	to	the	Line	of	the	
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Navy	in	1899.”480		Edwards	was	a	man	of	both	worlds,	and,	thus,	his	perspective	carried	
weight	among	his	fellow	officers.		
	 	Since	it	was	explicitly	drafted	in	response.	Taylor	wrote	an	undated	document	that	
correlated,	in	time,	to	the	Special	Committee’s	report	on	Taylor	and	Other	Systems	of	
Management	Consequently,	one	can	confidently	place	the	provenance	of	the	document	
between	May	and	August	1912.			In	the	three-page	document	Taylor	acknowledged	
Edward’s	article,	“The	Fetishism	of	Scientific	Management,”	by	name.	Taylor	did	not	
wrestle	with	Edward’s	major	points,	but	merely	observed,	“Admiral	Edwards	has	never	
been	inside	a	single	establishment	in	which	scientific	management	has	been	introduced.”481	
Taylor	assumed	that	was	enough	to	discredit	Edwards.		One	high	ranking	officers	argument	
represented	a	threat	to	Taylor’s	ideas,	but	any	such	attacks	paled	in	magnitude	to	those	of	
Meyer.			
	 Secretary	Meyer’s	tenure	was	anything	but	palatable	to	officers	in	the	Naval	
Constructer	corps.		Taylor	shared	the	sentiment.			To	this	end,	on	December	12,	1912,	
Radford	dispatched	a	revealing	letter	to	Taylor.		The	letter	itself	was	largely	unremarkable.			
Radford	merely	wanted	Taylor’s	input	as	to	the	potential	of	a	new	tool	that	Radford	took	
the	care	to	sketch.	However,	at	the	end	of	the	typed	letter,	Redford,	in	manuscript,	penned	
the	cryptic	message,		“P.S.	the	4th	of	March	approaches”-	nothing	else	is	intimated,	nothing	
else	is	said.482	Four	days	later,	Taylor	responded.			At	the	conclusion	of	his	letter	Taylor	
acknowledged	Radford’s	hand	written	message,	“I	note	the	very	important	fact	stated	by	
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you	in	MS.	at	the	end	of	your	letter.		Let	us	hope	for	the	best.”483			The	mysterious	note	
referenced	the	end	of	Secretary	Meyer’s	term,	on	March	4,	1913.	
	 With	the	exit	of	Meyer,	one	of	the	greatest	obstacles	to	the	acceptance	of	Taylor’s	
ideas	by	the	military	establishment	of	the	United	States	threats	was	removed.	Unions	
remained	a	problem,	but	a	manageable	one	without	a	friendly	ear	into	which	to	pour	their	
entreaties.			Despite	Meyer’s	hostility,	naval	officers,	especially	those	within	the	Constructor	
Corps,	sustained	and	expanded	the	use	of	scientific	management	within	the	Navy.484	In	the	
end,	Meyer	simply	impeded	the	depth	and	breadth	of	Taylor’s	influence,	for	a	time.			
	 The	election	of	President	Woodrow	Wilson	proffered	the	possibility	of	an	
administration	amenable	to	scientific	management.		Although	at	this	juncture,	Taylor	and	
the	naval	constructors	would	happily	take	a	disinterested	party.485	Nevertheless,	Taylor	
had	doubts	about	the	Navy’s	new	leadership,	based	on	speeches	by	the	new	Secretary	and	
Assistant	Secretary	of	the	Navy,	Josephus	Daniels	and	Franklin	Roosevelt,	respectively.486			
	 			Whether	from	fatigue,	frustration,	or	teaching	commitments	Frederick	Taylor’s	
correspondence	with	naval	officers	dwindled	in	the	last	two	years	before	his	death	in	
March	of	1915.	Taylor’s	supporters	within	the	Navy	had	largely	won	acceptance	of	
scientific	management	in	the	Navy,	if	not	in	name,	then	certainly	in	practice.		However,	
debate	about	Taylor’s	methods	moved	from	within	the	Army	arsenals	and	the	Navy	yards	
to	the	halls	of	Congress.		In	that	venue	unions	and	sympathetic	legislators	maintained	the	
pressure.		
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	 On	January	22,	1915,	Frederick	Dietrick	scored	a	major	win	for	the	unions.	He	
introduced	an	amendment	to	the	Army	spending	bill	that	stated:		
Provided,	That	no	part	of	the	appropriations	made	in	this	bill	shall	be		 available	for	
the	salary	or	pay	of	any	officer,	manager,	superintendent,	foreman,	or	other	person	
having	charge	of	the	work	of	any	employee	of	the	United	States	Government	while	
making	or	causing	to	be	made	with	a	stop		watch	or	other	time-measuring	device,	a	
time	study	of	any	job	of	any	such	employee	between	the	starting	and	the	completion	
thereof,	or	of	the	movements	of	any	such	employee	while	engaged	upon	such	work;	
nor	shall	any	part	of	the	appropriations	made	In	this	bill	be	available	to	pay	any	
premium	or	bonus	or	cash	reward	to	any	employee	-in	addition	to	his	regular	
wages,	except	for	-suggestions	resulting	In	improvements	or	economy	in	the	
operation	of	any	Government	plant	;	and	no	claim	for	services	performed	by	any	
person	while	violating	this	proviso	shall	be	allowed.487		
	 		
Two	weeks	later	a	similar	bill	killed	support	for	time	and	motion	studies	in	the	Navy.488	It	
appeared	that	scientific	management	in	the	Army	and	Navy	had	finally	been	dealt	a	
deathblow.	Yet	again	Taylors	views	were	to	arise,	like	Lazarus,	from	the	tomb.		
	 Evans,	Tardy,	Watt,	and	D.W.	Taylor,	among	others	Navy	Constructors,	grasped	what	
many	during	the	period	understood	only	implicitly.	Yes,	most	understood	that	scientific	
management	rationally	ordered	work	within	the	shop,	arsenal,	and	naval	yard	--whatever	
the	form—	to	increase	efficiency.			However,	the	latent	potency	of	this	process	did	not	
reside	in	the	physical	realm,	but	in	the	intellectual.		Taylor	himself	did	not	appear	to	fully	
sense,	at	least	initially	and	maybe	never	fully,	what	his	method	actually	wrought.		All	ideas	
evolve	and	mature	with	time	as	they	move	from	the	mind	to	practice	in	the	physical	realm.		
The	process	does	not	only	flow	in	one	direction.	Frequently,	the	spark	created	with	the	
collision	of	the	immaterial	and	material	world	illuminates	other	possibilities	that	remained	
dormant,	unknown,	and	unexplored	by	the	human	mind.		
																																								 																				
487	(52	Cong.	Rec.	2082,	1915)		
488	Aitken,	Taylorism	at	Watertown	Arsenal,	232.	
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	 Within	the	Army,	scientific	management	moved	forwardly	largely	at	the	behest	of	
General	Crozier.		Ordnance	officers	such	as	Colonel	Wheeler	played	an	important	role,	but	
direction	and	force	emanated	from	Crozier.	He	needed	methods	to	reduce	costs	at	the	
arsenals.		To	do	more	with	less	required	radical	change	in	selection	of	employees,	tools,	and	
methods.		Crozier	looked	for	solutions	and	found	them	in	the	ideas	of	Frederick	W.	Taylor.		
	 	As	was	the	case	in	the	Army,	the	Navy	sought	out	Taylor.		By	no	means	a	household	
name,	he	was	nevertheless	well	known	in	the	fields	of	engineering	and	industry.	Taylor’s	
friendship	with	Goodrich	preceded	his	advances	in	management,	and,	thus,	Goodrich’s	
proximity	to	Taylor,	in	absolute	terms,	was	much	closer	than	that	of	Crozier.	Goodrich	
exerted	no	time	searching	for	someone	who	knew	something	about	efficiency.	Fortune	had	
seen	to	that.		However,	the	progression	in	the	Navy	of	scientific	management	differed	
significantly	at	several	key	junctures.	Both	the	Army	and	Navy	launched	from	similar	points	
in	their	pursuit	of	efficiency,	but	they	rapidly	diverged	in	execution.			
	 If	the	French	Revolution	radically	changed	society	from	the	bottom	up	and	the	
Prussians	aimed	to,	“…do	from	above	what	the	French	have	done	from	below”489	the	United	
States	Army	and	Navy’s	intellectual	revolution	followed	along	a	similar	path.		Scientific	
Management	propagated	through	the	Army	from	above	with	Crozier,	and,	in	contrast,	the	
Navy’s	acceptance	of	the	methodology	was	spearheaded	by	Evans	and	the	constructors	
from	below.			Evans,	driven	by	a	devout	belief	in	the	efficacy	of	scientific	management,	
forfeited	his	commission	and	his	marriage	to	the	cause.		His	capable	and	determined	battle	
																																								 																				
489	Shearer	Davis	Bowman	Assistant	Professor	of	History	University	of	Texas	at	Austin,	Masters	and	Lords :	
Mid-19th-Century	U.S.	Planters	and	Prussian	Junkers	(Oxford	University	Press,	USA,	1993),	123;	The	Quarterly	
Review,	vol.	231	(London:	Leonard	Scott	Publication	Company,	1919),	37.	
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for	scientific	management	elevated	his	name	to	the	attention	of	eminent	individuals	such	as	
President	Taft.		
	 Taylor	and	Goodrich	had	some	success	laying	the	groundwork	in	the	Navy	for	
scientific	management	under	the	Roosevelt	administration.	Meanwhile,	Crozier	imposed	
Taylorism	on	the	arsenals	largely	unassisted	and	unopposed,	albeit	with	the	support	of	the	
Secretary	of	War.	However,	innovators	in	the	Navy	faced	Goliaths	of	another	size,	and	more	
than	just	one;	Secretary	of	the	Navy	Meyer	and	the	unions	came	in	first	and	second	
respectively,	and	line	officers	placed	a	distant	but	still	significant	third.	Construction	Corps	
officers	underwrote	the	successes	and	likewise	shared	in	the	defeats.		The	young	officers	
advanced	in	the	face	of	resistance	through	stubborn	and	not	infrequently	insubordinate	
actions.	
	 Frederick	W.	Taylor	throughout	this	pivotal	period	provided	emotional	and	material	
support.		Evans	and	Tardy,	and	many	other	constructors,	held	Taylor	in	almost	spiritual	
regard--not	as	a	demigod,	but	rather	as	a	prophet,	someone	enlightened	who	brings	a	
message	of	profound	truth.		Naval	constructors	were	trained	and	educated	engineers.	
These	were	not	men,	by	and	large;	who	were	superstitious;	rather	they	valued	mathematics	
and	logic.	Taylor’s	rational	system	extolling	efficiency	doubtless	appealed	to	them,	and	
given	the	degree	of	support,	provided	an	improvement	over	the	structure,	or	lack	of	
structure	for	the	nation’s	navy	yards,	that	previously	existed.			
	 To	the	Navy,	and	specifically	to	the	officers	of	the	Construction	Corps,	must	go	the	
honor	of	being	the	first	of	the	two	organizations	to	grasp	the	intellectual	potential	of	
scientific	management	as	a	system	of	thinking.	The	Army’s	heroic	idea	of	leadership	always	
caused	tension	in	the	relationship	between	men	and	machines.		The	Navy,	in	essence,	was	a	
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machine.	It,	of	course,	made	use	of	human	beings,	but	the	tools,	the	ship,	always	loomed	
larger	than	men.		From	the	inception	of	the	United	States	Navy,	naval	officers	embraced	the	
machine,	and	the	closer	they	connected	with	it	the	better	it	ran.			Scientific	management	
harmonized	men	with	machines	because	it	reduced	errors,	waste,	and	produced	a	
methodical,	calculable,	and	measurable	set	of	outcomes.		Properly	applied,	it	reduced	
chance,	the	ever	present	specter	for	those	who	prepared	for	and	engaged	in	organized	
conflict.	
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Chapter	VIII	
History	mattered	not,	because	it	changed	so	much	
	
	 In	the	final	analysis,	there	is	but	one	object	of	inquiry--	the	will.			Army	officers	are	
principally	concerned	with	executing	orders,	orders	that	in	some	manner	connect,	or	
should	connect,	back	to	a	political	objective.			Officers	direct	force	toward	aims	that,	at	least	
in	theory,	reduce	an	adversary’s	resolution	to	resist.	To	do	this,	and	do	it	well,	one	must	
intuitively	grasp	what	animates	men	to	action.		
	 Technology	has	increasingly	obscured	the	nature	of	war.		Like	layers	of	fog,	it	
shrouds	the	sharp	outlines	from	observation.		The	light	of	reality	fades	behind	the	
accumulating	layers	of	technology	with	knowledge	and	understanding	of	the	phenomenon	
suffering	proportionally.	More	to	the	point,	the	issue	is	less	about	technology	than	the	way	
we	think	about	it	and	how	it	conforms	one’s	perceptions.		This	is	especially	true	of	
Americans	over	the	course	of	the	past	century	or	more,	who	tend	to	look	for	technological	
solutions	to	most	problems.		Given	enough	time,	flawed	assumptions,	and	mistaken	beliefs,	
American	military	officers	typically	perceive	the	nature	of	war	through	the	technological	
means	of	its	execution.	If	the	nature	of	technology	is	to	order	and	control,	then	perhaps,	
war	–chaos--	lends	itself	susceptible	to	such	means.			
	 Technology	divorces	war	from	its	proper	focus,	which	is	man.		Writing	in	1934,	
Lewis	Mumford	observed,	“…the	principal	aim	of	our	mechanical	routine	in	industry	is	to	
reduce	the	domain	of	chance…”490	If	that	premise	is	correct,	then	the	industrial	
management	revolutionary	Frederick	Taylor	brought	about	one	of	the	greatest	mental	
																																								 																				
490	Mumford,	Technics	and	Civilization,	304.	
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revolutions	since	the	Enlightenment	and	Romantic	movements.		While	the	Enlightenment	
and	Romanticism	described,	“…ideas	about	what	relations	between	men	have	been,	are,	
might	be,	and	should	be…”	scientific	management	aimed	to	prescribe,	at	least	implicitly,	the	
relationship	between	men	and	their	machines.	491		
	 Taylor’s	approach	had	far	reaching	effects.		Army	officers	were	born	into	a		nation	
largely	devoid	of	military	traditions.		There	were	few	mores	to	confine	or	mold	early	
military	thought.	Those	that	did	exist	were	imported	from	France,	Britain,	and	Germany.	
Military	ideas	and	structures	introduced	from	the	distant	shores	of	the	Old	World	mingled	
and	amalgamated	into	a	uniquely	American	DNA.		Encoded	within	the	DNA	was	the	source	
material	that	formed	the	substrate	of	the	American	military	mind.			
	 The	rugged	landscape	of	North	America	produced	an	equally	tough	and	practical	
mindset	in	Army	officers.	There	was	no	time	for	abstract	thought,	theory	and	philosophy	as	
they	attended	to	the	demanding	duties	of	westward	expansion.		Preoccupied	with	
constabulary	functions,	Army	officers	expended	precious	little	resources	on	the	intellectual	
development	of	their	profession.		
	 Officers	came	from	a	people	that	prized	liberty,	individuality,	and	industrious	action.		
These	values,	in	a	manner	that	no	one	could	quite	have	predicted,	produced	an	optimism	
that	permeated	American	culture,	a	hope	in	the	future,	in	the	potential	of	this	city	on	a	hill.		
It	was	the	Zeitgeist	of	the	age.	Driven	by	what	they	perceived	to	be	divine	statute,	
Americans	expanded	geographically	with	a	conviction	and	determination	rarely	witnessed	
in	history.	The	Army	drew	its	officers	from	such	stock.		
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	 By	the	1860’s,	boys	that	had	once	shared	an	awe	of	those	who	fought	in	the	
American	Revolution	assumed	the	field	in	gray	and	blue	while	both	sides	invoked	the	spirit	
of	‘76.		War,	for	them,	was	no	longer	a	child’s	game	and	officers	matured	quickly	in	the	
battles	they	waged	during	four	years	of	brutal	conflict.		Lessons	were	learned	at	a	terrible	
cost.				But	if	Alexander,	Caesar,	and	Napoleon	achieved	victory	through	heroic	leadership,	
the	American	Civil	War	whispered	of	change	in	the	understanding	of	warfare.	
History	exercises	a	powerful,	if	centrifugal,	effect	on	the	mind.		It	provides	the	raw	material	
out	of	which	the	mind	extrapolates	potential	and	likely	futures.		Like	a	puzzle,	the	mind	
assorts	the	pieces	to	form	impressions.	Yet,	the	pieces	are	malleable,	pliable,	and	
impressionable.	Beginning	with	similar	such	pieces,	each	mind	constructs	a	unique,	though	
related,	picture.		If	a	particular	ideal	or	concept	begins	to	permeate	the	organism,	in	
whatever	form	that	idea	may	be,	it	gains		momentum,	a	propensity	and	a	Mentalität	is	
formed.492		
As	both	larger	societies	and	military	organizations	in	the	Western	World	
professionalized	at	an	accelerated	rate	at	the	turn	of	the	twentieth	century,	there	emerged	
a	sense	of	increased	tempo,	of	interconnectedness,	and	the	importance	of	time	
management.			Among	officers	in	the	United	States	Army,	there	was	a	growing	awareness	of	
America’s	increased	role	on	the	world	stage.		And	though	rarely	explicitly	stated,	officers	
confessed	that	they	were	profoundly	unprepared	for	this	future.		Rapid	industrialization	
and	proliferation	of	the	machine	hailed	the	dawn	of	a	new	age.		Ideas	about	leadership	
evolved.		In	the	factory,	arsenals,	and	naval	yards	the	mantra	became	efficiency.		Leaders	
were	not	born	as	much	as	manufactured,	and	it	seemed	that	one	no	longer	led	men--one	
																																								 																				
492	Dennis	E.	Showalter,	“The	Prusso-German	RMA	1840-1871,”	Knox	and	Murray,	The	Dynamics	of	Military	
Revolution,	1300-2050,	112.	
	
	
183	
managed	them.	What	has	been	claimed	as	the	uniquely	American	philosophy	of	practicality	
fused	naturally,	almost	organically,	with	the	idea	of	management.				
Naval	officers,	especially	from	its	Constructor	Corps,	pursued	scientific	management	with	
the	zeal	of	true	believers.	The	Navy,	after	all,	was	a	fleet	of	machines.			The	union	of	
Taylorism	and	the	Navy	made	for	a	happy	one,	at	least	if	Holden	Evans	had	his	way.		
Nevertheless,	the	constructors	divined	the	trend	more	clearly	than	most.		Management	is	
about	control.	It	is	a	thought	process	that	dictates	how	one	arranges	the	pieces	of	the	
puzzle,	a	perception	predicated	on	time.			
Prior	to	World	War	I,	Army	officers	had	more	difficulty	harmonizing	man	and	
machine,	and	the	trends	of	management	were	confined	to	arsenals	and	similar	facilities.	
Armies	still	moved	at	the	pace	of	beasts	of	burden.		Pride	of	place	still	fell	to	the	cavalry	as	
it	had	for	much	of	the	past	two	thousand	years.		Perhaps	nothing	captured	the	heroic	ideal	
better	than	the	mounted	officer	leading	his	men	from	the	front.	Regardless,	the	U.S.	Army	
Ordnance	Branch	and	arsenals	provided	sufficient	soil	for	the	ideas	of	scientific	
management	to	take	root.		
World	War	I	was	a	watershed	event	for	the	U.S.	Army.		The	perceived	existential	
threat	thrust	innovation	to	the	forefront	and	neutralized	the	micro-management	that	a	
peacetime	Congress	had	imposed	on	military	procurement.		Governmental	funding	pushed	
breakthroughs	into	mass	production	at	a	rate	scarcely	imaginable	before	the	war.		Fleets	of	
airplanes	and	tanks	appeared	over	and	on	the	battlefields	of	Europe.		Officers	began	to	
measure	success	by	the	number	of	artillery	shells	fired,	leading	to	a	four-year	total	of	an	
estimated	one	billion	shells.		Heroism	appeared	to	count	for	little	in	industrialized	warfare.	
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Clausewitz	observed,		“…the	superiority	of	numbers	is	the	most	common	element	in	
victory.”493	He	was	right,	but	he	had	in	mind	numbers	of	men.		After	the	experience	of	
World	War	I,	officers	thought	in	terms	of	materialschlacht,	a	battle	of	material.		Primacy	in	
battle	moved	from	man	to	machine.		Mumford	perhaps	captured	it	best:	“In	time-keeping,	
in	trading,	in	fighting	men	counted	numbers;	and	finally,	as	the	habit	grew	only	numbers	
counted.”494			The	U.S.	Navy	epitomized	this	approach	in	the	military	realm,	measuring	the	
overall	efficiency	of	the	fleet	in	the	number	of	battleships	it	claimed—48	in	1914	to	be	
exact.495	
Taylor’s	formulation	of	scientific	management	was	predicated	on	the	idea	of	efficacy	
through	reductionism	by	eliminating	wasted	movements	and	unnecessary	steps.	Yet,	
scientific	management	portended	a	more	significant	change,	one	of	thought,	especially	in	
management	and	leadership.		It	highlighted	a	shifting	view	of	time.	The	artisan	and	
craftsman	gave	way	under	the	pressures	of	accelerating	temporal	rhythms.	Modern	
conceptions	of	time,	with	increasing	divergence	from	natural	time,	became	something	that	
one	calculated,	controlled,	and	saved.		
	 The	mechanical	realm	is	controllable,	orderly,	and	certain	and	when	overlaid	on	
man,	in	theory,	produces	predictable	results.		Thus,	the	ordering	of	the	day,	numbering	and	
delineating	of	tasks,	and	the	breaking	down	of	one’s	daily	life	by	time	eliminates	or	at	least	
reduces	chance.			Therefore,	man	appears	to	gain	greater	control	over	time	and	of	the	
future.		Historically,	where	once	progress	was	almost	imperceptibly	slow,	now	progress	
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495	“Studies	of	the	General	Board	of	the	Navy,”	November	17,	1914,	420–422,	Record	Group	80,	National	
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became	something	that	one	not	only	perceives,	but	can	also	exert	considerable	control	
over.		
	 In	industrial	warfare,	chance	frequently	was	portrayed	in	a	negative	light	as	
something	to	be	reduced	and	eliminated.		However,	chance	is	not	necessarily	a	negative	or	
even	an	undesirable	event.	Certainly,	one	desires	reliability	and	control	in	nuclear	reactors	
and	the	like,	but	creativity	and	spontaneity	inevitably	introduce	an	essential	element	of	
chance	into	war.	It	is	fundamental	to	the	human	experience,	and	thus,	intrinsically	part	of	
warfare.	Officers	pay	lip	service	to	its	role	while	at	the	same	time	honing	the	skills	of	
technicism	designed	to	reduce	chance.	
	 The	implications	of	technicism	for	military	affairs	were	subtle	and	yet	incredibly	
powerful.	A	byproduct	of	technological	immersion	is	the	illusion	of	control	and	specious	
contextual	understanding,	of	eliminating	or	reducing	the	sources	of	Clausewitzian	fog	and	
friction.		One	believes	that	he	can	perceive	and	have	knowledge	of	phenomena	to	a	far	
greater	degree	than	is	actually	the	case.		This	illusion--	caused	by	technological	
determinism--distorts	reality	and	forces	warfare	into	a	realm	of	abstraction	in	which	it	can	
be	subdued,	harnessed,	and	made	rational.	Intellectually,	and	thus,	theoretically	and	
doctrinally,	the	unquestioning	embrace	of	technicism	does	violence	to	the	authenticity	of	
war.	
	 Temporal	acceleration	altered	and	greatly	contributed,	at	an	intellectual	level,		
to	how	men		perceived	modern	warfare.	Over	the	first	three	decades	of	the	twentieth	
century	in	America,	the	spirit	of	Taylor	and	scientific	management	permeated	academia,	
management,	and	political	and	military	spheres.			Officers	and	political	leaders	became	
more	rational	and	scientifically	minded	in	embracing	intellectual	processes.		Thus	war	
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became	more	rationalized.		The	mantra	of	“the	war	to	end	all	wars”	flowed	freely	and	
frequently	on	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic,	a	wholly	understandable	conclusion	given	the	
carnage	of	World	War	I.		Echoes	from	the	Western	Front	further	confirmed	the	necessity	
for	embracing	an	orderly,	methodical	nature	of	battle-	reduced	to	timed	movements	and	
phase	lines.	The	perfect	synchronization	of	infantry	and	artillery	to	cross	no-man’s	land,	
the	measured	shells	per	meter	of	trench	line	to	insure	success	all	contributed	to	the	belief	
in	a	rational,	reducible,	calculable	method	of	warfare.	The	French,	in	the	inter-war	period,	
defined	their	army	doctrine	as	“methodical”	battle.496		What	is	methodical	but	an	entirely	
systematic,	controlled,	and	rational	time-bound	process	to	achieve	a	desired	end	state,	
regardless	of	its	physical	and	mental	effects	on	individual	participants?	
	 If	military	minds,	prior	to	1914,	perceived	only	minor	temporal	tremors	in	the	
conduct	of	war	it	remained	essentially	a	contest	between	men,	a	contest	of	wills.		The	
temporal	pressures	of	modernity,	of	their	age,	remained	trapped	in	the	historical	mind	of	
man.		History	mattered	because	it	resembled	the	present	and	thus	cast	light	on	the	
questions	of	the	future.			The	linear	flow	of	logic,	of	reason,	requires	extrapolation	of	past	
trends.	But	every	trend	comes	to	an	end.		Therefore,	officers	entered	the	First	World	War	
with	a	mind	nurtured	on	the	exploits	of	ages	long	past.	Paul	Fussell	in	The	Great	War	and	
Modern	Memory	observed:	
…the	Great	War	was	perhaps	the	last	to	be	conceived	as	taking	place	within	a	
seamless,	purposeful	‘history’	involving	a	coherent	stream	of	time	running	from	past	
through	present	to	future.		The	shrewd	recruiting	poster	depicting	a	worried	father	
of	the	future	being	asked	by	his	children,	‘Daddy,	what	did	you	do	in	the	Great	War?’	
assumes	a	future	whose	moral	and	social	pressures	are	identical	with	those	of	the	
past…but	the	Great	War	took	place	in	what	was,	compared	with	ours,	a	static	world,	
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where	the	values	appeared		stable	and	where	the	meanings	of	abstractions	seemed	
permanent	and	reliable.	Everyone	knew	what	Glory	was,	and	what	Honor	meant.497	
	 	
	 From	the	Iliad	(circa	800	B.C.)	to	the	present	there	is	a	discernable	continuity	to	
values	and	ideals	celebrating	the	journey	of	heroes.	Not	that	their	ends	are	the	same,	for	
they	are	not,	but	the	values	–not	what	they	serve-	are	nearly	universal.	Courage,	honor,	
self-discipline,	sacrifice,	and	truth	were	values	that	men	sought,	yet,	the	mind	and	
imagination	anticipate	and,	arguably,	demands	their	exemplification	in	the	face	of	mortal	
danger.		In	both	prose	and	poetry	over	the	centuries,		heroism	shines	brightest	in	the	
shadow	of	death.	Nevertheless,	the	image	of	the	ideal	hero	and	the	reality	of	the	modern	
battlefield	seem	almost	incompatible.		Paul	Fussell	purportedly	said	in	an	interview	with	
PBS	for	“The	Great	War”	series,	“heroism	doesn’t	matter	when	you’re	not	fighting	hand-to-
hand.”498	There	is	an	undeniable	logic	to	Fussell’s	statement.		Neither	an	artillery	shell	nor	a	
guided	missile	has	any	regard	for	the	soldier’s	skill	or	bravery;	these	qualities	never	enter	
into	the	equation.	
	 Therefore,	the	reality	of	scientific	management,	of	the	modern	battlefield	clashed	
with	the	deeper	impulses	of	men.		Officers	were	attracted	cerebrally	to	science	and	
technology,	to	numbers	and	ratios,	to	methods	and	formulas;	quantitatively	measurable	
and	rational,	these	solutions	provided	an	absolute	means	to	contrast	with	the	means	
available	vis-a-vis	other	nations.		Indeed,	it	was	the	officers’	duty	to	impose	Jominian	order	
on	the	Clausewitzian	chaos	of	battle	in	order	to	achieve	assigned	missions.		Technology	at	
once	increased	and	extended	the	ability	of	officers	to	control--while	seemingly	rendering	
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498	Paul	Fussell,	“The	Heroic	Connotation	of	War,”	PBS,	The	Great	War,	(n.d.),	
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the	human	element	irrelevant	or	at	least	largely	inconsequential.		Courage	still	mattered,	
for	an	army	of	cowards	wins	no	battles,	but	its	significance	diminished	at	the	individual	
level.			This	was	perhaps	the	thrust	of	Fussell’s	statement.		
	 Thus,	if	the	conduct	of	war	has	changed	over	time,	which	seems	a	reasonable	
proposition,	it	appears	that	man,	in	respect	to	the	technology-driven	advances	in	warfare,	
remained	psychologically	static.		This	discrepancy	has	created	a	great	deal	of	tension	
clearly	observable	in	how	neurosis	and	shell-shock	were	first	diagnosed.		Line	and	medical	
officers	alike	struggled	to	explain	how	brave	men	“suddenly”	became	cowards.		Technology	
transformed	the	battlefield	and	men	psychologically	grappled	to	function	in,	let	alone	
understand	it.			World	War	I,	for	the	first	time	in	human	history,	stripped	man	of	that	
psychological	armor	on	a	scale	previously	unimaginable.		Men	by	the	tens	of	thousands	
broke	under	the	strain	of	industrialized	warfare.	British	soldiers	on	the	Somme	could	
endure	no	more	than	Roman	legionnaires	two	thousand	years	earlier.			
	 The	dawn	of	mechanized	warfare	swept	those	before	it	into	a	frenzy	of	technical	and	
scientific	prognostication.			Scientific	management	of	both	men	and	material	no	longer	
belonged	solely	to	the	field	of	business,	but	now	was	the	concern	of	states.	Interestingly,	
the	practical	nature	of	Americans	and	the	agrarian	myth	abetted	this	process.		The	United	
States	came	of	age	late	in	this	process	of	nation-state	development.		Its	history	and	
heritage,	and	that	of	its	officer	corps,	were	necessarily	young.		The	intellectual	traditions	
that	existed	belonged	to	the	old	world.		And	as	Tocqueville,	Commager,	and	Hofstadter	
were	to	observe,	a	lack	of	tradition	produced	a	spiritual	reverence	for	the	practical,	the	
utilitarian.		
	
	
189	
	 	The	intellectual	trends	of	the	prewar	era	and	lessons	of	World	War	I	created	a	
peculiar	American	Mentalität,	a	disposition	to	think	along	particular	lines.		Taylorism	built	
on	the	strong	undercurrents	of	American	practicality	and	Army	engineering.		Soon,	the	U.S.	
tried	to	mass-produce	combat-ready	soldiers	and		leaders	in	the	same	manner	it	had	
cranked	out	automobiles.	The	convergence	of	these	factors	created	a	unique	perspective	of	
modern	war.			The	industrial	and	manufacturing	lessons	were	obvious,	but	those	of	
leadership	were	less	so.		If	victory	on	the	European	battlefields	seemed	a	question	of	
production	then	the	age	of	heroic	leadership	was	at	a	close.	The	application	of	scientific	
management	to	men	“produced”	a	new	type	of	leader,	an	upshot	of	the	American	synthesis	
-	the	manager.		
	 Managers	are	not	leaders	in	the	traditional	sense	for	their	primary	concern	is	for	
efficiency	not	men.	Their	concern	for	subordinates	extends	only	so	far	as	it	affects	
production.			Success	and	failure	are	reduced	to	numerical	results.		Indeed,	the	generals	of	
the	First	World	War	steeled	themselves	to	regard	casualties	as	an	inevitable,	if	inefficient,	
cost	of	doing	business.			Questions	were	of	quantity,	for	only	that	which	is	reducible	to	
measurement	mattered.		Conversely,	heroes	and	leaders	inspire,	they	consistently	nurture	
values	(or	virtues	as	the	ancients	call	them),	qualities	that	are	ethereal	and	distinctly	
intangible	and	often	spiritual.		While	managers	bet	primarily	on	quantities,	leaders	depend	
mostly	on	qualities.	In	many	respects,	both	are	products	of	their	time.		Managers	came	into	
existence	only	with	the	industry	while	leaders	are	natural	outgrowths	of	the	human	
experience.	This	may	explain	the	aversion	that	people	generally	demonstrate	toward	
managers	whose	primary	objective	is	numbers	rather	than	people;	such	priorities	appear	
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unnatural,	even	mechanical,	especially	to	the	soldiers	who	have	to	pay	for	the	manager’s	
success.		
	 The	Mentalität	of	the	U.S.	officer	corps	and	the	development	of	the	manager,	as	a	
type	in	that	body,	go	hand	in	hand.	There	is	a	propensity,	a	logic	to	the	relationship.		If	war	
was	becoming	more	technologically	focused	as	a	question	of	material,	production,	and	
numbers,	then	logic	dictated	that	managers,	as	officers,	play	a	larger	role	both	on	economic	
and	battle	fronts.499	The	increasing	“temporal	rhythms”	of	modern	life	provided	further	
evidence	of	this	change.	History,	at	least	superficially,	appeared	less	and	less	illuminating	
the	further	one	progressed	into	the	twentieth	and	twenty-first	centuries.			The	logic	of	
circumstances	drove	officers	to		pursue	the	next	widget	of	war	that	widened	the	gulf	
between	human	values	and	technicism,	between	heroic	and	material	warfare.		Mumford	
observed	(1934),	“[this]	phenomenon…[can	be]	described	as	the	‘cultural	lag.’	The	failure	
of	‘adjustment’	may	be	looked	upon	as	a	failure	of	art	and	morals	and	religion	to	change	
with	the	same	degree	of	rapidity	as	the	machine	and	to	change	in	the	same	direction.		This	
seems	to	me	an	essentially	superficial	interpretation.”500	
	 It	is	a	superficial	interpretation	because	“…change	in	a	direction	opposite	to	the	
machine	may	be	as	important…”501	Thus,	propensity	does	not	equate	to	rightness	or	
correctness’	it	is	merely	the	most	obvious	force.		American	Army	officers	after	World	War	I	
perceived	the	general	material	trend	and	in	the	intervening	years,	with	growing	speed	and	
momentum,	moved	toward	a	culture	of	technicism.		
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	 The	accelerated	tempo	of	World	War	I	and	the	wars	that	followed	it	imparted	an	
idea	of	technological	and	scientific	dependency.	The	trend	apparent	to	officers	created	a	
divergence	between	the	man	and	machine.			The	results	of	World	War	I	indicated	that	
victory	resided	with	material	dominance,	and	thus,	tactical	success	on	the	battlefield	
through	quantity	of	technology	became	synonymous	with	strategic	victory.	The	ability	to	
deliver	overwhelming	levels	of	fire	became	the	U.S.	mantra.		By	the	post-Korean	War	era,	
attritional	warfare,	war	by	kill/death	ratios,	became	a	strategy	even	for	nuclear	
annihilation.		The	divergence	of	man	from	war	focused	so	heavily	on	the	latter	that	
strategists	largely	failed	to	account	for	the	power	of	the	will	and	other	intangible	factors.			
	 Joseph	Campbell	in	the	Power	of	Myth	argued:	“People	say	that	what	we’re	all	
seeking	is	a	meaning	for	life.	I	don’t	think	that’s	what	we’re	really	seeking.	I	think	that	what	
we’re	seeking	is	an	experience	of	being	alive,	so	that	our	life	experiences	on	the	purely	
physical	plane	will	have	resonances	within	our	own	innermost	being	and	reality,	so	that	we	
actually	feel	the	rapture	of	being	alive.”502	
In	a	similar,	if	not	more	compelling,	statement,	George	Orwell	suggested	in	his	1940	review	
of	Mein	Kampf	by	Adolf	Hilter:	 	
	 Also	he	[Hitler]	has	grasped	the	falsity	of	the	hedonistic	attitude	to	life.	Nearly	all	
western	thought	since	the	last	war,	certainly	all	“progressive”	thought,	has	assumed	tacitly	
that	human	beings	desire	nothing	beyond	ease,	security	and	avoidance	of	pain.	In	such	a	
view	of	life	there	is	no	room,	for	instance,	for	patriotism	and	the	military	virtues…Hitler,	
because	in	his	own		 joyless	mind	he	feels	it	with	exceptional		 strength,	knows	that	human	
beings	don’t	only	want	comfort,	safety,	short	working-hours,	hygiene,		birth-	 control	and,	
in	general,	common	sense;	they	also,	at	least	intermittently,	want	struggle	and	self-
sacrifice…whereas	Socialism,	and	even	capitalism	in	a	more	grudging	way,	have	said	to	
people	“I	offer	you	a	good	time,’’	Hitler	has	said		 to	them	“I	offer	you	struggle,	danger	and	
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death,”	and	as	a	result	a	whole	nation	flings	itself	at	his	feet.503		
	
	 The	thought	process	of	scientific	management	takes	no	account	of	the	forces	
described	by	Campbell	and	Orwell.		“War	by	algebra”	only	provides	part	of	the	formula,	as	
Clausewitz	observed,	and	arguably	the	less	potent	part.504	In	large	measure	this	was	not	a	
failure	of	officers	to	adjust	to	the	tempo	of	modernity,	but	a	spurious	interpretation	of	
temporal	compression	that	resulted	in	the	conclusions	of	what	scientific	management	and	
technology	could	achieve	in	relation	to	man.		In	the	end,	man	is	moved	by	ideas,	values,	and	
faith.		Any	successful	geo-political	strategy	must	acknowledge	and	account,	to	some	degree,	
for	these	factors.		The	techno-centric	officer	corps	overestimated	the	machine	and	
underestimated	the	importance	of	the	timeless	values	organic	to	man—perhaps	history	
matters	after	all.		
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Appendix	I	
	
Literature	Review	
	
	
	 The	literature	review	is	divided	into	two	sections	to	facilitate	clarity.		First,	
American	society,	with	its	diverse	inclinations	and	attitudes,	is	examined	to	extract	the	
common	themes	and	shared	beliefs	that	diffused	throughout	the	corporate	body.	The	
review	begins	with	a	brief	analysis	of	the	nature	of	technology	and	then	moves	to	examine	
the	American	mindset	toward	technology.		Second,	the	attitude	of	the	army	and	its	
associated	institutions	is	examined	to	demonstrate	the	common	bonds	between	the	civilian	
and	military	world.	The	survey	begins	with	the	colonial	period	and	develops	
chronologically	from	there	laying	the	foundation	for	chapter	three.		
Americans’	Relationship	with	Technology	
	
	 Technology,	science	and	industry	are	distinct	though	related	concepts,	often	
interdependent	but	developing	along	unique	and	divergent	paths.	The	concepts	of	
technology	and	science	from	the	colonial	period	through	the	post	atomic	world	science	and	
technology	were	frequently	conflated.	Thus,	historical	terminology,	given	the	proximate	
relationship,	is	somewhat	loose,	often	using	the	terms	interchangeably.		Nevertheless,	early	
Americans	were	not	overly	concerned	with	concrete	definitions	and	by	the	early	
nineteenth	century	the	belief	that	these	mechanical	marvels	improved	everyday	life	was	
quite	prevalent.			
	 Nearly	every	major	work	on	the	history	and	evolution	of	technology	over	the	last	
eighty	years	begins	with	an	ode	to	Lewis	Mumford.		The	breadth,	analysis	and	synthesis	he	
applied	to	understanding	the	nature	of	technology	remains	unmatched.	In	Technics	and	
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Civilization	(1934)	Mumford	divides	the	last	thousand	years	into	three	phases.	The	
eotechnic	phase,	or	Middle	Ages,	is	where	Mumford	begins	his	analysis,	believing	that	
modern	technology	had	its	origins	at	this	point	rather	than	the	more	commonly-cited	date	
of	the	mid-Eighteenth	Century.	Thus,	the	eotechnic	phase	extends	from	1000	A.D.	until	the	
mid-Seventeenth	Century	and	is	primarily	powered	by	the	“water-and-wood	complex.”		
The	eotechnic	phase	is	followed	by	the	paleotechnic	phase,	fueled	by	a	“coal-and-iron	
complex;”	last,	the	neotechnic	phase	is	driven	by	an	“electricity-and-alloy	complex.”505	
Mumford	never	provided	a	concise	definition	of	technology.	Rather,	and	quite	
intentionally,	he	used	the	Greek	word	Tekhne	that	conveys	a	concept	of	both	art	and	craft.	
Likewise,	Mumford	argued	man’s	nature	-before	anything	else-	was	that	of	the	“mind-
maker”	before	“took-maker”.506	Mumford	described	this	phenomenon,	and	is	perhaps,	one	
of	the	first	historians	to	underline	the	shift	that	McGilchrist	later	identified	from	a	
hemispheric	perspective.		Mumford	ascribed	this	process	to	the	propagation	of	technology.	
Technology	has	many	modern	definitions.		Nearly	all	of	them,	regardless	of	where	the	
emphasis	falls,	demonstrate	a	desire	and	intent	to	control	that,	according	to	McGilchrist,	is	
one	of	the	defining	facets	of	the		brain’s	left	hemisphere-a	desire	to	control	and	see	things,	
including	people,	as	tools.		
	Mumford	succinctly	summarized	the	process	whereby	the	living	are	reduced	in	
order	of	precedence.	Science	deformed	“experience	as	a	whole…the	instruments	of	science	
were	helpless	in	the	realm	of	qualities.	The	qualitative	was	reduced	to	the	subjective,	the	
subjective	was	dismissed	as	unreal,	and	the	unseen	and	unmeasurable	appeared	non-
existent.	Intuition	and	feeling	did	not	affect	mechanical	process	or	mechanical	
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explanations.”507	Mumford	believed	that,	in	this	respect,	science	did	not	bring	one	closure	to	
an	“objective	experience”,	but	rather	represented	a	“departure	from	it.”508	Therefore,	unlike	
Descartes,	who	believed	that	mathematics	enabled	one	to	discern	truth,	Mumford	argued	
that	mathematics	did	just	the	opposite	in	the	human	realm.	If	Mumford	identified	broadly	
across	time	and	geography,	Alexis	de	Tocqueville	recognized	trends	particular	to	the	
American	experience.		
	 	Few	men	were	better	positioned	to	observe	this	first	stage	in	American	invention	
than	Alexis	de	Tocqueville,	a	French	politician	and	historian	who	traveled	America	in	the	
1830s.		His	travels	resulted	in	the	publication	of	Democracy	in	America	(1835).		Alexis	de	
Tocqueville	observed	that,	“at	a	time	when	Americans	were	naturally	inclined	to	ask	
nothing	of	science	but	its	particular	applications	to	the	practical	arts…among	the	
enlightened	nations	of	the	Old	World…they	found	celebrated	scholars,	skillful	artists,	and	
great	writers,	and	they	were	able	to	gather	up	treasures	of	the	intellect	without	needing	to	
accumulate	them.”509	Even	at	this	early	stage	in	American	development	the	technological	
character	appeared	vividly	to	the	foreign	observer,	in	part	because	the	eyes	of	the	old	
world	looked	upon	the	new.		The	utilitarian	character	of	the	common	American	struck	de	
Tocqueville	as	somewhat	peculiar	and	certainly	different	from	that	of	Europe.	Alexis	de	
Tocqueville	identified	American	qualities	while	Robert	Gordon	indicated	the	possible	
origins	of	those	qualities.			
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	 Robert	B.	Gordon	in	“Technology	in	Colonial	North	America”	(2005)	argued	that	
“technology	is	a	record	of	cultural	choice.”510	Not	all	emigrants	shared	the	same	values—
those	of	Western	Europe	were	not	those	of	Eastern	Europe,	and	those	of	Italy	were	not	
those	of	Norway.	Thus,	the	colonial	port	of	embarkation	mattered	in	the	direction	of	
technological	choice.	Geography	likewise	inclined	production	and	technological	
development	in	colonial	America.	The	southern	colonies	and	towns,	being	more	isolated,	
matured	along	particular	lines	quite	divergent	from	those	in	the	Northern	colonies.		By	
1785	colonies	north	of	Virginia	had	begun	to	industrialize,	providing	the	base	from	which	
the	Industrial	Revolution	later	launched	in	America.		Nations,	organizations,	people	
rejected	technologies	and	ideas	that	were	not	compatible	with	their	values.	In	the	American	
context	the	utilitarian	inclination	removed	many	of	the	barriers	that	typically	inhibit	
adoption,	especially	in	religion,	as	Charles	Sanford	noted.	
	 “The	Intellectual	Origins	and	New-Worldliness	of	American	Industry”	(1958)	by	
Charles	Sanford	observed	that	during	the	early	Eighteenth	century	there	remained	
significant	reservations	toward	the	moral	degradations	of	industrialization.511	Leading	men,	
such	as	Thomas	Jefferson,	believed	that	a	virtuous	nation	maintained	that	character	
through	an	agrarian	economy.		The	idea	of	transitioning	to	an	industrialized	economy	
brought	the	horrors	of	manufacturing	plants	from	Great	Britain	to	the	shores	of	the	United	
States	and	threatened	to	corrupt	the	new	world.			
	 Sanford	examined	how	early	industrialists	within	America	sought	to	minimize	the	
effects	of	industrialization	upon	the	American	character.	Through	their	work	and	the	
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effects	of	the	War	of	1812	the	idea	of	economic	independence	gained	popular	acceptance	
and	by	1817	garnered	support	from	Jefferson	and	Madison.		Furthermore,	manufacturing	
eventually	assumed	aspects	of	spiritual	regeneration,	and	as	Gordon	observed,	the	cultural	
choice	freed	Americans	from	European	practices.	Thus,	industrial	technology	assumed	not	
only	support	of	the	founding	fathers,	but	also	the	mantle	of	spiritual	renewal.	This	turning	
point	went	no	small	way	in	contributing	to	a	generally	positive	view	that	Americans	have	
toward	technology	and	what	it	can	achieve.		
Americans	demonstrated	a	marked	difference	from	Europeans	in	their	attitudes	
toward	land.		By	the	late	eighteenth	century,	foreign	travelers	reported	restlessness	and	a	
spirit	of	optimism	permeated	the	American	character.	The	subjugation	of	nature	through	
the	development	of	road	networks	and	vast	canals	proceeded	at	a	feverish	pace	in	the	early	
nineteenth	century,	according	to	James	Williams	in	“The	American	Industrial	Revolution”	
(2005).512	The	363-mile	canal	that	connected	the	Hudson	River	to	Lake	Erie	dwarfed	
anything	ever	attempted	in	Europe.		The	“canal’s	engineers	had	little	or	no	practice	
building	anything…they	learned	on	the	job…”	Americans	proved	time	and	again	that	
tireless	effort	and	persistence	could	overcome	even	the	apparently	impossible.	The	rapid	
propagation	of	the	steamboats,	railroads,	and	the	telegraph	strengthened	ties	amongst	a	
large	though	dispersed	population	in	a	vast	country.		The	transportation	and	
communication	advances	not	only	tightened	social	bonds	but	also	set	the	stage	for	rapid	
industrialization	in	the	mid-nineteenth	century.		Williams,	like	Smith,	believed	that	the	
American	arms	industry	provided	the	motive	and	energy	to	advance	machine	tools	in	place	
of	the	European	traditional	craftsman.		
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National	identities	are	not	shaped	by	an	infinite	number	of	factors,	nor	are	all	
influences	equal	and	likewise	they	do	not	have	an	equal	effect	upon	all	members;	however,	
a	majority	or	vocal	minority	is	often	enough	to	incline	behavior,	in	whatever	form	that	
takes,	in	a	particular	manner.	Some	corporate	experiences	deeply	affect	the	minds	of	
nations	according	to	Henry	Steele	Commager	in	The	American	Mind	(1950)	as	he	examined	
major	influences	on	American	thought	from	the	1880s	to	the1940s.513		Commager	argued	
that	the	American	environment,	in	its	totality,	exercised	and	ingrained	the	American	mind	
of	the	Nineteenth	Century	with	a	particular	perspective.	Breaking	the	traditional	bonds	of	
Europe,	the	land,	religion,	and	freedom	inclined	the	mind	toward	a	newfound	optimism	at	
the	possibilities	inherent	in	America.		As	a	result,	the	American	mind	eschewed	the	
traditional,	class-bound	traditions	of	the	old	world	and	forcefully	gravitated	towards	
mechanical	and	technological	solutions.		
Gordon	and	Commager	both	believed	that	Americans	assumed	and	demonstrated	an	
appreciation	for	practical	and	technological	solutions.	However,	Commager	attributed	that	
to	newly	developed	and	acquired	traits	through	the	broad	abandonment	of	European	
values	and	the	amalgamation	of	diverse	peoples	in	an	environment	largely	free	from	
constraints.		By	contrast,	Gordon	argued	that	the	settlers,	where	they	came	from,	and	the	
attributes	of	those	people	amalgamated	into	the	American	character.	Both	authors	
perceived	a	similar	result,	however,	the	means	and	methods	were	of	different	character,	
though	not	entirely	in	opposition.			
Commager	found	an	“intense	practicality,”	common	sense,	and	“incurable	
utilitarianism”	gripped	the	average	American.	The	geography	itself	beckoned	an	intense	
																																								 																				
513	Commager,	The	American	Mind.	
	
	
199	
individualism	and	a	mechanical	inclination	and	fascination	grew	apace	within	the	American	
mind.		Ideas	ungoverned	and	unchained	from	the	traditions	of	Europe	gave	breadth	to	the	
American	mind,	and	the	environment	induced	a	utilitarian	turn.	
	 “Mirror-Image	Twins:	The	Communities	of	Science	and	Technology	in	19th-Century	
America”	(1971)	by	Edwin	Layton	orients	the	narrative	about	the	development	of	
technology	as	a	profession.514		Layton	demonstrates	that	the	relationship	between	science	
and	technology	is	not	as	clear	and	concise	as	is	often	assumed.	The	relationship	is	often	
described	in	the	following	manner	“science	creates	new	knowledge	which	technologist[s]	
then	apply…that	this	view	of	science-technology	relations	has	continued	into	the	20th	
century	was	demonstrated	by	Vannevar	Bush,	who	headed	the	Office	of	Scientific	Research	
and	Development	in	WWII…	.”		Science	and	technology	shared	similarities	but	aimed	to	
achieve	different	goals.		Science	aims	to	understand	and	enlarge	knowledge	in	a	particular	
field.		However,	that	knowledge	rarely	creates	technology	directly.		The	first	aimed	for	the	
abstract	and	theoretical	while	the	latter	aimed	for	the	utilitarian	and	practical.	One	may	
build	a	technology	without	understanding	the	scientific	properties	of	the	various	elements	
involved.		Thus,	the	US	military	invested	vast	sums	in	the	advancement	of	science	following	
World	War	II	with	the	expectation	that	such	knowledge	increased	military	technology.		
However,	Project	Hindsight,	a	1963	Department	of	Defense	(DoD)	initiative,	examined	
several	weapons	programs	to	evaluate	the	role	of	scientific	funding	in	their	development	
and	found	direct	linkages	quite	tenuous.515	
	 Layton	does	not	explicitly	address	the	American	attitudes	and	mindsets	toward	
technology	that	Commager	and	Gordon	describe,	but	he	does	highlight	a	growing	interest	
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and	maturing	of	the	American	mind	in	this	respect.	The	importance	of	technology	gained	
momentum	with	the	First	World	War	and	ascended	to	new	heights	following	the	Second	
World	War.		In	this	respect,	Layton	described	what	Mumford	had	feared.		
	 Many	historians	interested	in	the	impact	of	technology	on	the	American	psyche	
found	World	War	I	to	be	critical	to	redefining	or	perhaps	intensifying	that	relationship.		
Thomas	P.	Hughes	in	American	Genesis	observed	(1989)	that,	by	the	time	of	the	First	World	
War,	American	invention	had	shifted	from	the	individual	to	managerial,	corporate	and	
governmental	development.	516		Not	until	the	development	of	the	Internet	would	individuals	
arguably	rise	to	the	forefront	of	invention	again.	The	role	of	the	military	in	the	
advancement	of	technology	is	far	greater,	and	started	much	earlier	than	is	often	assumed.		
According	to	Hughes,	“by	1900	they	had	reached	the	promised	land	of	the	technological	
world…[and]	had	acquired	traits	that	have	become	characteristically	American.”517		Hughes	
perceived	a	propensity	in	American	behavior	to	seek	technological	solutions,	in	all	arenas,	
with	little	regard	to	the	social	costs.			Hughes	acknowledged	Mumford’s	concern	and	
addressed	them	to	some	degree	in	the	Human-Built	World	(2005);	nor	did	Hughes	share	
Mumford’s	discomfort	with	the	military	cast	of	innovation	technology.		To	Hughes’	mind,	
technology	is	benign	in	nature,	as	is	humanity.	Mumford,	however,	is	almost	reticent	to	
describe	his	view	on	human	nature	and	its	relationship	with	technology,	but	he	conveys	the	
feeling	that	he	wishes	that	it	were	otherwise.518	
	 Wherever	the	initial	utilitarian	impetus	resided,	as	noted	by	Commager	and	Gordon,	
Hughes	concludes	that	the	rough	outline	took	shape	by	the	turn	of	the	twentieth	century.			
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How	different	that	transformation	might	have	looked	if	the	earliest	colonists	had	not	been	
of	European	descent	is	difficult	to	ascertain	with	any	certainty.		However,	Hughes’	
argument	does	appear	amenable	to	Commager’s	thesis.		Freed	from	conventional	and	
traditional	constraints,	the	individual	inventor	found	practical	solutions	to	the	challenges	
encountered	in	the	new	world.			
	 Rudi	Volti	in	Society	and	Technological	Change	(2006)	examined	the	nature	of	
technology,	how	it	evolves,	and	the	reciprocal	relationship	of	technology	and	society.	Volti	
warned	that,	“…the	spectacular	successes	of	technological	development	should	not	blind	us	
to	the	fact	that	some	of	the	inherent	difficulties	of	life	are	simply	not	amenable	to	
technological	solutions.”519		If	Hughes	remained	agnostic	on	the	subject,	a	disinterested	
observer,	Volti,	much	like	Mumford,	was	more	concerned	by	the	direction	of	technology	
and	its	interplay	with	the	military.		However,	Volti	noted,	the	order	and	control	that	
technology	offers	often	subsumes	most	doubts	on	the	ability	of	technology	to	solve	the	
most	complex	problems.	According	to	Volti,	while	technology	might	be	highly	successful	in	
many	venues,	it	is	entirely	unsuited	to	solving	complex	human	problems.		Hughes	
acknowledged	this	deficiency	but	his	analysis	is	more	descriptive	than	prescriptive.	Volti	
went	to	great	lengths	to	describe	the	error	of	attempting	technological	solutions	to	deeper	
social	problems.			
	 Brian	Arthur	in	The	Nature	of	Technology	(2009)	argued	technology	is	inherently	
iterative,	that	it	builds	upon	that	with	which	existed	prior.		Technology	also	develops	from	
the	use	and	harnessing	of	natural	phenomenon.	There	is	arguably	no	good	finite	definition	
of	technology,	which	attests	to	the	multi-faceted	nature	of	technology	itself.	Arthur	tackled	
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this	question	through	a	broad	tri-tiered	definition:	“...	a	means	to	fulfill	a	human	purpose,	
…[an]	assemblage	of	practices	and	components,	…entire	collection	of	devices	and	
engineering	practices	available	to	a	culture.”520	Arthur,	quite	apart	from	Mumford,	
perceived	technology	as	organic;	it	evolves,	improves	one	upon	the	other,	nor	does	he	
explicitly	or	implicitly	have	any	discomfort	with	propensity	of	modern	technology	to	
control	and	order	human	life.	
	 Arthur	believed	that	“history	is	important”	because	all	technological	advancements	
are	combinations	of	others	that	already	exist	or	that	develop	from	new	domains	that	are	
discovered,	but	are	also	organically	derived	from	what	existed	prior.	Perhaps	it	falls	out	of	
his	preview,	but	if	history	informs	technological	development	and	it	evolves	from	what	
existed	prior,	then	this	propensity	suggest	that	Mumford’s	concerns	are	justified.		Arthur,	
not	unlike	Hughes,	is	concerned	more	with	analysis,	evolution,	and	technological	processes	
than	social	tensions	that	result.			Interestingly,	as	a	professor	of	economics	Arthur	
explained	how	initially	“puzzled”	he	was	that	historians	of	all	people	seemed	to	have	the	
most	to	say	about	the	nature	of	technology.	However,	a	historian’s	query	is	man,	and	
technology,	at	its	root,	is	an	extension	of	man.521		
	 In	summary,	the	available	studies	that	addresses	American	society’s	relationship	
with	technology	suggest	that	this	relationship	developed	organically	beginning	in	the	early	
eighteenth	century.				By	the	turn	of	the	nineteenth	century	the	American	mind,	greatly	
influenced	by	the	progress	made	during	the	Second	Industrial	Revolution,	perceived	that	
larger	societal	issues	could	be	solved	through	technological	means.	The	First	World	War	
brought	that	idea	to	maturity	and	the	relationship	inverted.	No	longer	did	the	man	wield	
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the	tools	(technology)	of	war,	but	now	the	machine	assumed	center	stage	and	man	
assumed	a	subordinate	role.		
The	American	Military’s	Attitudes	Toward	Technology	
The	literature	reviewed	here	is	focused	principally	on	the	US	Army,	although	writers	
such	as	Colin	Gray	(2006)	tend	to	lump	the	military	as	a	whole	together.		His	assessment,	as	
such,	amalgamates	into	large	conclusions	using	a	“way	of	war”	construct	to	make	broad	
generalizations	about	all	the	services’	dependence	and	reliance	on	superior	technology.522	
However,	there	are	fundamental	differences	between	the	Navy	and	the	Army.		Army	
officers	have	significantly	more	interaction	with	an	enemy	populace	than	the	Navy	while	a	
naval	officer’s	work	revolves	entirely	around	the	machine	he	captains.	Thus,	Army	officers	
are	expected	to	have	a	deeper,	more	comprehensive	understanding	of	the	cultural	–and	
thus	social--environment	in	which	they	operate.		The	proper	relationship	between	the	
army	and	government	was	a	debate	of	considerable	importance	in	late	eighteenth	century	
America.	
The	Federalist	Papers	(1787)	is	among	the	first	documents	to	reflect	American	
attitudes	at	the	time	of	the	founding	of	the	nation	toward	the	military	and	how	and	what	
military	should	do	to	provide	for	the	common	defense	as	outlined	in	the	U.S.	Constitution.			
These	writings	predate	the	ratification	of	the	U.S.	Constitution,	but	what	they	had	to	say	
about	using	technology	in	concert	with	the	military,	how	the	military	should	or	should	not	
leverage	the	technology	coming	out	of	the	Enlightenment,	and	the	ongoing	Scientific	
Revolution	is,	as	expected,	quite	sparse.				Early	Americans	demonstrated	a	deep-seated	and	
broadly	shared	antipathy	toward	any	kind	of	professional	army,	especially	one	controlled	
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by	the	federal	government.		Alexander	Hamilton,	in	the	Federalist	24,	argued	that	
Americans	should	not	assume	“an	excess	of	confidence	or	security”	afforded	them	by	two	
vast	oceans.523		Commager’s	argument	on	the	role	of	geographical	factors	in	shaping	the	
American	mindset	are	exemplified	in	this	statement	by	Hamilton.	The	dangers	of	British	
territories	to	the	north	and	west,	and	Spanish	to	the	south	required	some	kind	of	force	in	
kind	to	protect	the	confederation’s	interest.	Indian	tribes	along	the	Western	frontier	be	
could	be	relied	upon	to	act	in	their	own	interest,	and	sometimes	in	consonance	with	that	of	
Britain,	for	in	this	measure	they	intermingled;	thus,	a	standing	army	albeit	a	small	one	was	
not	only	desirable,	but	also	necessary	under	the	circumstances.		The	propensity,	thus	
established,	shaped	the	structure,	direction,	and	mindset	of	the	military,	and	citizens	
toward	it,	for	the	better	part	of	a	century.		
Technology	remained	of	secondary	or	tertiary	importance	behind	leadership	and	
discipline	for	an	army	of	this	period.	Technology	was	not	a	significant	factor	as	of	yet—at	
least	for	landlubbers!		At	this	point	the	Army	and	Navy	ideas	about	technology	began	to	
diverge.	For	the	Army,	the	discussion	turned	on	trained	men,	who	controlled	them,	and	the	
total	quantity	available.		For	millennia,	across	all	civilizations,	numbers	counted	for	more	
than	anything	else,	and	this	rule	held	true	in	late	eighteenth	century	America.	Americans	at	
this	time	perceived	technology	as	something	that	provided	incremental	advantages,	but	
such	advantages	were	largely	subordinate	to	natural	ability	and	leadership.		
In	the	world	of	military	education,	the	Prussians	professionalized	first	following	
their	crushing	defeat	at	Jena-Auerstadt	(1806)	at	the	hands	of	Napoleon.		Prior	to	the	Civil	
War	the	US	Army	officer	corps	lacked	a	motivating	experience	of	similar	magnitude	to	
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seriously	consider	professionalization.		Although,	the	War	of	1812	did	provide	some	
movement	toward	officer	professionalization,	but	the	nascent	officer	corps	and	larger	
political	factors	militated	against	significant	Army	reforms.				
Technology	is	not	necessarily	limited	to	physical	means;	it	can	also	be,	and	in	the	
twenty-first	century	more	and	more	commonly	is,	organizational	and	informational	in	
nature.		In	this	respect,	both	as	to	military	thought	and	production,	intellectual	and	
material	progress	failed	to	take	hold	in	any	permanent	form	until	after	the	First	World	War,	
although	the	Root	reforms	initiated	movement.	While	the	Civil	War	increased	Northern	
industrial	capacity,	the	long-term	implications	for	the	army	were	quite	muted.			
John	Shy	in	A	People	Numerous	and	Armed	(1976)	examines	the	early	American	
military	experience	and	the	propensity	of	American	militarism	assumed	from	those	events.		
Shy	found	that	an	“…unthinking	optimism	about	the	natural	American	aptitude	for	warfare,	
and	an	ambivalent	attitude	toward	those	Americans	who	specialized	in	the	use	of	force,	all	
have	had	consequences	in	the	twentieth	century…"524	In	this	respect,	Shy’s	findings	do	not	
differ	much	from	the	ideas	that	Hamilton	confronted,	although	Shy	perhaps	identifies	a	
more	strident	militarism	in	the	colonial	character.		Not	of	a	professional	strain	of	course,	
but	recourse	to	violence	appeared	more	common	and	socially	accepted,	if	not	encouraged	
in	this	period.		Since	the	first	colonist	set	foot	on	the	new	world,	enmity	and	insecurity	had	
gone	hand-in-hand	with	daily	life	as	relationships	with	indigenous	populations	varied	from	
tribe	to	tribe	and	from	one	moment	to	the	next.			Adequate	security	for	the	colonists	among	
the	outlying	and	scattered	farms	was	beyond	their	capabilities.	But	“retribution”	was	
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something	they	could	repay	several	fold	and	on	their	terms.525		Men	of	natural	ability,	
hunters,	and	other	civilians	provided	for	the	general	security,	not	professional	soldiers.	
However,	this	also	fed	into	Jefferson’s	hope	of	the	citizen-soldier	crafted	in	the	shadow	of	
Rome’s	Republican	armies	to	provide	for	the	common	defense.		
The	Seven	Years	War,	the	American	Revolutionary	War,	and	the	War	of	1812	
reinforced	the	perception	that	typical	Americans	–none	of	them	professional	soldiers-	
could	achieve	victory	over	standing	armies	commanded	by	aristocratic	officers.	Federalist	
No.	24	contrasted	sharply	with	the	common	American	citizen	of	the	period.	Hamilton,	a	
man	of	formidable	intelligence	and	knowledge,	advocated	a	strong	central	government	and	
envisioned	a	strong	standing	army	to	help	solidify	the	American	state.		Hamilton	was	
perhaps	motivated	by	a	darker	or	more	realistic	interpretation	of	human	nature	and	its	
historical	narrative	up	until	the	late	eighteenth	century	and	informed	historically	by	the	
Roman	experience.		He	thought	a	professional	army	a	necessity.		His	views	were	the	
exception	and	appeared	to	conflict	with	actual	experience	as	American	amateurs	racked	up	
impressive	wins	over	the	next	150	years.			
The	decisive	defeat	of	Mexico,	the	destruction	of	the	Confederacy,	and	the	
dismantling	of	the	Spanish	Empire	all	contributed	to	and	further	reinforced	the	belief	in	
American	exceptionalism,	which	included	being	exceptional	in	what	it	could	achieved	
without	military	specialists	and	professionals.		America	met	the	demands	of	the	moment	
through	fierce	action.		In	some	respects	this	affirmed	the	observations	of	Alexis	de	
Tocqueville	of	the	American	propensity	for	utilitarian	and	practical	solutions,	eschewing	
more	arcane	and	theoretical	approaches	(such	as	general	staffs).				
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Military	professionalism	hinted	at	an	old	world	heritage	that	Americans	had	thrown	
off.				These	tendencies	were	thoroughly	inculcated	by	the	Army.		A	process	of	rapid	
military	expansion	followed	by	an	equally,	and	sometimes	sharper,	contraction	kept	
professionalism	and	army	growth	in	check.		This	formula	appeared	to	offer	all	the	benefits	
of	a	standing	army	without	any	of	the	associated	costs	and	dangers.		American	military	
action	was	not	only	decisive	and	effective	as	a	way	to	decide	national	security	affairs,	but	
one	might	achieve	those	ends	without	the	“unnecessary”	burden	experienced	by	nations	
with	professional	armies.			Hamilton’s	proposed	old	world	approach	never	gained	the	
necessary	support,	nor	should	it	have	when	the	citizen-soldier	bore	the	burden	with	great	
success	(or	so	the	narrative	went.)		
Thinking	deeply	about	war	appeared	neither	desirable	nor	necessary	in	light	of	
early	American	experiences.	Thus,	Shy	observed,	“new	ideas	were	absorbed	and	reshaped	
by	old,	deeply	imbedded	modes	of	thinking	about	war.”526	One	can	never	outrun	one’s	
history,	entirely.	And	often	those	ideas,	values,	beliefs	persist	longer	and	influence	to	far	
greater	degrees,	weather	consciously	or	unconsciously,	than	one	would	like	to	believe.	
Marcus	Cunliffe’s	analysis	in	Soldiers	and	Civilians:	The	Martial	Spirit	in	America,	
1775-1865	(1968)	surveyed	early	American	society	and	focused	on	the	relationship	and	
perception	of	civilians	toward	the	Army	and	vice	versa.	In	times	of	peace	Cunliffe	noted	a	
general	suspicion	of	the	military	fortified	with	a	healthy	degree	of	indifference.	If	
Americans	learned	anything	from	war,	specifically	the	Civil	War,	Cunliffe	observed,	“[it]	
was	in	fact	optimistic.”	Despite	American	animosity	toward	the	Army,	war	(or	at	least	its	
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results)	itself	had	favored	the	young	nation.		Force,	more	often	than	not,	achieved	results.	527		
Shy,	like	Cunliffe,	noted	that	Americans	had	shared	a	reservation	toward	a	professional	
army	that	did	not	extend	to	the	act	of	war	itself.		This	tendency	informed	future	generations	
and	the	path	chosen	for	resolution.	Hamilton	might	have	thought	a	professional	army	
necessary,	but	Cunliffe’s	observations	confirmed	Hamilton’s	experience	of	a	general	
ambivalence	toward	things	of	a	military	nature	and	little	changed	between	the	
Revolutionary	War	and	the	Civil	War.		
Technicism	developed	organically	from	the	American	experience.	And	by	the	early	
nineteenth	century	private	and	public	development	began	to	intermingle	at	an	increasingly	
accelerated	pace.		Merritt	Roe	Smith	in	Military	Enterprise	and	Technological	Change	(1987)	
posited	that	“…military	enterprise	has	played	a	central	role	in	America’s	rise	as	an	
industrial	power	and	that	since	the	early	days	of	the	republic,	industrial	might	has	been	
intimately	connected	with	military	might.”528	The	Army	Ordnance	Corps	provided	an	early	
and	critical	link	with	private	industry	to	expand	manufacturing	processes.		American	
armories	served	not	only	as	repositories	but	incubators	of	knowledge	for	methods	and	
processes	that,	in	part,	formed	the	bedrock	for	American	industry.		This	line	of	
development	diverges	from	professionalism,	or	the	lack	thereof	that	Shy	described,	but	the	
separation	is	neither	wide	nor	absolute.		Rather,	the	streams	run	parallel	and	at	points	
converge.		The	Civil	War	served	as	another	example	of	citizen-soldiers	winning	wars,	even	
though	most	of	the	senior	leaders	on	both	sides	were	graduates	of	military	academies.	
Likewise,	the	relationships	between	private	and	public	industry	formed	important	and	
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memorable	bonds	in	the	Civil	War.		These	bonds,	like	muscle	memory,	naturally	renewed	
and	increased	with	each	war.		
If	the	collective	American	mind	seemed	reticent	and	at	times	hostile	to	a	
professional	army,	as	Shy	observed,	it	held	no	such	reservations	towards	industrial	
technology.			The	practical	and	utilitarian	nature	of	Americans	had	no	difficulty	embracing	
the	potential	of	industrial	production.			Where	theory,	military	tradition,	and	the	
aristocracy	belonged	to	the	old	world;	the	seeds	of	technology	and	production	appeared	
fruits	of	the	new.		The	Civil	War	brought	officers	and	early	industrialists	together	for	
mutual	benefit—especially	in	the	Northeast.		Thus,	the	relationship	between	Army	officers	
and	industrial	production	sprouted	early,	at	least	in	the	Northeast,	and	suffered	little	from	
the	negative	associations	historians	have	observed	relative	to	military	intellectualism.		
American	management	practices	colluded	with	scientific	conceptions	of	best	
practices,	which	laid	the	foundation	for	Taylorism,	a	management	system	that	sought	to	
increase	industrial	efficiency	by	analyzing	and	standardizing	individual	tasks.	The	roots	of	
technicism	were	firmly	planted	early	in	American	history.		The	general	acceptance	of	
technological	and	scientific	solutions	to	practical	problems	became	a	hallmark	of	the	
American	character.		Yet,	as	Shy	noted,	that	American	officer	thought,	though	it	certainly	
utilized,	little	about	technology	or	its	influence	upon	war	until	after	1890.529		Despite	this,	
the	Civil	War	strengthened	the	bonds	between	the	military	engineer	and	private	American	
industry	and	the	relationship	only	grew	closer	as	the	years	passed.		
The	abysmal	conduct	of	the	war	of	1812	shocked	the	Army’s	nascent	officer	corps’	
(and	the	nation’s)	faith	in	the	amateur	citizen	soldier.	According	to	William	Skelton	in	an	
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American	Profession	of	Arms,	The	officers	who	fought	in	this	conflict	were	sufficiently	
motivated	by	its	results	to	begin	the	process	of	professionalization.530	The	early	officer	
corps	drew	frequently	and	deeply	from	the	well	of	science.531		The	officer	corps	did	not	
develop	in	a	vacuum.		In	addition	to	West	Point,	which	served	as	the	first	engineering	
college	in	America,	the	rapid	growth	of	science	and	technology	through	the	antebellum	
period	produced	a	like-minded	officer.532	Additionally,	European	and	especially	French	
influence	on	the	professionalization	of	America	in	general	and	the	Army	in	particular,	
cannot	be	overstated.		Thus,	Gordon’s	thesis	on	the	role	of	cultural	origin	in	choice	finds	
considerable	support	in	later	literature.533		
Samuel	Huntington	in	The	Soldier	and	the	State	(1957)	argued	that	the	institutions	
of	war,	necessary	for	cultivating	the	military	mind,	manifested	only	after	the	Civil	War,	and	
on	this	point,	Skelton	and	Huntington	face	off.		Skelton,	writing	decades	later,	argued	that	
the	impulses	for	professionalization	formed	before,	not	after,	the	Civil	War.		However,	the	
locus	and	quality	of	that	professionalization	are	equally	important	questions.		For	
Huntington,	one	cannot	escape	one’s	history,	and	thus,	Jefferson’s	idea	of	the	citizen-soldier	
continued	into	the	future	well	beyond	its	usefulness.		Ideas	never	perish,	they	merely	
slumber	and	for	this	reason,	as	Shy	implied,	Americans	by	character,	culture	and	
environment	are	reticent	to	fully	engage	in	the	theoretical	study	of	war	which	is	at	odds	
with	their	willingness	to	often	use	war	in	all	its	forms	as	a	practical	tool	to	solve	defense	
and	security	problems.		
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532	Ibid.,	180.	
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According	to	Matthew	Moten	in	The	Delafield	Commission	and	the	American	Military	
Profession	(2000),	the	Delafield	Commission	was	dispatched	to	Europe	in	April	of	1855	to	
observe	all	aspects	of	the	military	field.		Secretary	of	War	Jefferson	Davis	hoped	to	use	the	
information	gathered	from	the	trip	to	rectify	perceived	shortcomings	within	the	US	
military.		Furthermore,	Moten’s	analysis	revealed	“Antebellum	expertise	manifest[ed]	three	
flaws.”		These	included	an	overreliance	on	French	military	thought,	West	Point’s	
engineering	focus,	and	military	officers	finding	recompense	for	civilian	rather	than	military	
efforts.534		
The	US	Army	from	its	inception	had	developed	from	a	nucleus	of	science	and	
engineering	at	West	Point	conceived	by	Jefferson	as	a	way	to	develop	engineers	that	could	
assist	with	the	development	of	the	young	nation’s	infrastructure.	Jefferson	firmly	believed	
in	the	capacity	of	patriot	soldiers	and	with	equal	fervency	the	danger	posed	by	an	elite	
officer	corps.			Moten’s	work	was	congruent	with	Huntington’s	earlier	arguments	about	the	
officer	corps’	Technicism.	Officers	never	developed	a	deep	understanding	of	the	nature	of	
war	and	this	was	by	design.		As	the	United	States	matured	it	grappled	with	the	study	of	war	
reluctantly,	at	first,	and	relied	almost	entirely	on	the	old	world	for	guidance—or	in	today’s	
parlance,	“best	practices.”		The	activity	at	the	federal	armories	and	West	Point’s	
engineering	focus	were	congruent	in	nature	and	this	harmony	abetted	a	propensity	in	
thought	and	action.				
Professionalization	moved	through	the	corps	in	close	conjunction	with	the	
professionalization	of	other	fields	in	American	society,	but	at	a	far	slower	rate.535		
Professionalization	near	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century	assumed,	as	Smith	observed,	an	
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industrial	and	managerial	component	that	initially	developed	earlier	in	the	century	in	the	
armories	and	nested	easily	within	an	engineer’s	intellectual	framework.	An	unintentional	
bifurcation	of	the	officer	corps	occurred	between	those	stationed	in	the	east	and	northeast	
and	those	that	served	on	the	western	frontier.	Army	officer	professionalism,	especially	for	
those	in	the	northeast,	found	its	impetus	not	in	potential	threats	or	in	the	ashes	of	defeat,	
but	rather	in	the	impulse	derived	from	a	growing	technical	complexity	as	war	appeared	to	
have	far	more	in	common	with	science	and	technology	than	the	humanities,	and	thus,	the	
trend	devolved	in	that	direction.		The	technical	focus	of	the	east	amalgamated	with	the	
practical	bent	of	those	officers	serving	in	the	west	and	southwest.			
Carol	Reardon	in	Soldiers	and	Scholars	(1990)	examined	the	gradual	encroachment	
of	civilian	academia	from	1865-1920	on	the	use	and	study	of	military	history	by	officers.		
Military	history	waged	from	the	onset	a	rearguard	action	against	the	encroachment	of	
science,	engineering,	and	eventually	even	social	science	on	the	development	of	Army	
officers.	The	Army	officer	corps	of	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	century	twisted	
and	distorted	military	history	on	the	alter	of	practicality	and	utility	the	damage	thus	
inflicted	rendered	the	results	largely	ineffectual.536	The	distance	between	reality	and	the	
Army	fiction	reached	unsustainable	proportions	and	was	likely	to	have	grave	consequences	
in	the	future.	The	officers,	true	to	the	intellectual	roots	that	Moten	articulated,	perceived	
history	as	a	tool	to	be	wielded	-like	science-	without	any	regard	to	the	art.	The	US	Army	
officer	corps,	from	its	inception	and	certainly	its	professionalization,	centered	nearly	
entirely	on	this	facet.	The	Army	officer	corps	developed	in	isolation,	as	Huntington	noted,	
especially	in	the	west,	but	as	Skelton	argued	it	also	professionalized	with	other	fields	in	
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America,	but	mainly	in	the	east.	For	a	soldier	coming	of	age	in	the	last	several	decades	of	
the	eighteenth	century	professionalization	remained	a	distinctly	subjective	proposition.		An	
engineer	officer	posted	to	the	Watertown	arsenal	in	Massachusetts	probably	understood	
professionalism	to	be	quite	different	from	an	infantry	officer	serving	on	the	western	
frontier.			
In	The	American	Way	of	War	(1973),	Russell	Weigley	found,	like	Moten,	that	the	
American	military	mind	was	predisposed	to	a	particular	way	of	thinking,	in	this	instance,	
how	it	waged	wars.537	The	U.S.	military	never	developed	its	own	philosophical	thoughts	on	
the	nature	of	war.	Rather	it	shifted	with	the	vagaries	of	the	European	battlefield.	At	one	
moment	French,	the	next	German,	and	then	back	again,	it	was	never	quite	sure	of	itself.		As	
Cunliffe	noted,	Americans	in	general	did	not	think	deeply	on	things	of	a	military	matter,	and	
as	a	result,	the	Army	officer	corps	adopted	foreign	ideas	readily.	The	Germans	and	French,	
staunch	enemies,	did	not	agree	on	much,	but	the	legacies	of	Napoleon	exerted	no	small	
amount	of	influence	on	the	next	two	hundred	years	of	war,	and	for	that	reason	the	search	
for	decisive	battles	–annihilation-	consumed	the	American	military	mind	and	constituted	
the	American	Way	of	War	in	the	minds	of	some	historians.		
Brian	Linn	in	The	Echo	of	Battle	(2007)	expanded	the	trail	first	blazed	by	Weigley.		
Linn	argued	that	there	exist	three	traditions	within	the	American	Way	of	War.		First	were	
the	“Guardians”	who	constituted	a	traditional	view	that	war	is	both	science	and	art.	The	
Heroes	were	those	that	believed	in	the	“human	element”	above	all	others.	The	Managers	
comprised	the	last	group,	believing	that	war	was	the	art	of	production	and	resource	
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management.538	These	three	groups	are	not	“mutually	exclusive”	and	one	finds	advocates	
for	each,	but	they	do	wrestle	for	ascendancy.	Weigley	argued	that	annihilation	defined	the	
American	Way	of	War,	while	Linn	assumed	a	nuanced	argument	that	at	different	points	in	
American	history	war	was	waged	by	different	rule	sets.	Regardless,	the	horrors	of	the	
modern	battlefield	combined	with	power	of	modern	firepower	produced	some	of	the	first,	
and	arguably	the	most	clear,	fissures	in	the	preeminence	of	the	heroic	soldier	image.	
	 In	Beating	Plowshares	into	Swords:	The	Political	Economy	of	American	Warfare,	
1601-1865	(1996),	Paul	Koistinen	examined	the	American	experience,	which	seized	upon	
technological	solutions	to	a	greater	degree	than	most.		Technology	and	the	economy	are	
two	different	though	related	products	of	man.	The	economy	is	the	product	of	and	produces	
technology	in	scale.	War,	especially	since	the	late	eighteenth	century,	has	relied	on	the	
organized	production	of	major	end	items	to	support	the	vast	increase	in	the	size	of	armies.	 	
Koistinen	divided	the	economy	of	America	into	four	major	parts:	political,	economic,	
technological	and	military.	Koistinen	observed	that	the	American	economy	developed	
through	three	clearly	discernable	stages	preindustrial,	transitional,	and	industrial	over	this	
period.	Koistinen’s	analysis	closely	parallels	Linn’s	three	traditions,	which	mirror	the	
economic	development	of	the	U.S.	Army.	The	Army	officer	profession	mirrored	this	
economic	development.		Skelton	alluded	to	this	when	noted	how	Army	professionalism	
matured	in	parallel	with	other	professions	in	American	society.		
	 The	United	States	political	system	largely	relegated	the	military	to	the	sidelines	
during	the	preindustrial	and	transitional	stages	of	economic	development	because	one	
could	meet	the	challenges	of	warfare	during	this	period	with	citizen-soldiers,	as	Shy	
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observed.		This,	however,	changed	as	technologies	advanced	and	the	economy	matured	and	
the	earliest	seeds	sprouted	in	the	arsenals.			
	 The	most	influential	aspect	of	the	four	in	determining	the	character	and	direction	of	
the	economy,	according	to	Koistinen,	is	the	political	element.		Koistinen	does	not	provide	a	
concise	definition	of	technology,	as	that	is	somewhat	peripheral	to	his	main	argument;	
however,	his	work	contributes	to	a	broader,	if	not	more	holistic	understanding	of	the	
cultural	context	for	the	American	Way	of	War	and	its	economic	development	and	how	
those	forces	helped	shape	how	American	officers	perceive	and	conduct	war.	For	the	
American	Army	officer,	professionalism	and	the	study	of	it	became	more	about	production	
and	technology	than	the	study	of	military	theory.		War,	the	nature	of	it,	was	a	question	of	
material,	numbers,	and	management.		
Walter	Kretchik	in	U.S.	Army	Doctrine	From	the	American	Revolution	to	the	War	on	
Terror	(2011)	examined	the	evolution	of	Army	doctrine.		Kretchik	traced	the	development	
or	borrowing	of	doctrine,	beginning	with	Baron	von	Steuben	and	the	Continental	Army.			
Early	American	doctrine	through	the	First	World	War	often	consisted	of	gross	plagiarism	of	
French	material,	in	some	cases	copied	nearly	verbatim.		The	US	Army,	a	relatively	young	
institution	in	comparison	to	its	European	counterparts,	lacked	a	strong	military	tradition,	
and	in	many	ways	prided	itself	on	that	fact.	Thus,	without	adequate	tradition	or	desire	the	
US	Army	simply	looked,	as	noted	by	Molten,	at	the	European	battlefields	for	answers.	And	
whichever	military	dominated	at	that	period	became	the	outline	the	Army	attempted	to	
trace.	Most	frequently	this	was	the	French	Army,	especially	following	Napoleon,	with	his	
success	and	dependence	on	mass	conscription	seemed	the	perfect	fit	for	early	America.539	
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Kretchik	observed	that,	“War	college	committees	studying	France,	Germany,	Great	
Britain,	Japan	and	the	Soviet	Union,	as	well	as	other	nations	including	Italy	and	
Switzerland,	were	all	filtered	through	an	American	Cultural	lens.	If	foreign	doctrine	did	not	
mesh	with	American	political	and	societal	norms,	as	well	as	military	values,	it	was	often	
discounted.”540	The	clear	and	rational	Machiavellian	approach	is	not	displayed	here,	but	a	
preference	for	the	familiar,	the	known,	not	an	impulse	to	explore	and	embrace	future	
potential,	but	reluctance	to	break	with	the	past.		“Principles	were	the	immutable	truths,”	
Kretchik	noted,	“that	anchored	the	intellect,”	intellectually	moored	to	the	old	world.		Thus,	
Army	officers	never	fully	discovered	the	possibilities	that	resided	outside	the	self-inflicted	
intellectual	limits.	
***	The	civilian	and	military	minds,	in	respect	to	technology,	paralleled	each	other	
throughout	much	of	American	history.		However,	the	alignment	remained	equivalent	in	
direction	only	the	diffusion	and	speed	of	technological	adoption	depended	on	the	
amalgamation	of	many	disparate	factors.		Like	most	nations	the	U.S.	was	born	through	war,	
yet,	in	the	American	case	the	birth	came	relatively	late	in	the	process	of	state	formation.		
Free	from	the	inertia	that	often	restrains	social	change	Americans	readily	adopted	
technology	in	conjunction	with	utilitarian	needs	largely	uninhibited	by	religious,	
institutional	or	bureaucratic	barriers.		
The	emergence	of	the	U.S.	coincided	fortuitously	with	the	advance	of	science	and	
technology.		The	meeting	produced	a	mentalität,	“…a	common	mindset	generating	similar	
approaches	to	common	problems…”541	The	seemingly	limitless	potential	of	technology	to	
solve	every	day	problems	that	had	bedeviled	man	for	thousands	of	years	imbued	that	
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217	
technology	with	profound	qualities,	that	when	measured,	it	processed	only	superficially.					
Technological	benefits,	by	their	nature	visible,	were	extolled	in	great	measure	and	
enthusiastically	embraced	by	individuals	and	corporate	bodies	alike;	yet,	the	social	costs,	
the	second	and	tertiary	effects	were	no	less	acute	albeit	less	amenable	to	quantitative	
measurement	and	frequently	emerged	only	have	an	extended	incubation	period	usually	
measured	in	a	score	or	more-	generational.		
The	Army	was	less	an	institution	and	more	an	organism,	exemplifying	the	
characteristics	of	a	living	creature	with	all	of	its	instinctual	and	intellectual	faculties	that	
one	might	attribute	to	a	predator.			Technology	enhances	these	instinctual	skills--	the	eyes,	
the	limbs,	the	claws--	the	ability	to	kill.	Yet,	technology	only	amplifies	what	already	exists	in	
the	organism.		It	is	not	additive	in	nature,	abilities	are	multiplied	through	the	use	and	
employment	of	technology,	but	smarter	it	does	not	one	make.			
The	Army	moved	firmly	and	slowly	but	not	out	of	step	with	the	potential	of	
technology.	Initially,	technology	provided	no	absolute	superiority	on	the	battlefield	tactical	
success	depended	more	on	discipline	and	leadership.		Human	attributes	varied,	but	those	
prized	here	in	the	new	world,	as	noted	by	de	Tocqueville,	were	of	a	practical	and	utilitarian	
strain,	of	the	blood	and	sweat	kind.			The	Civil	War	demonstrated	the	power	of	
manufacturing	and	advances	in	technology	to	many	observers	both	foreign	and	domestic.	
Nascent	Army	professionalism	and	weak	intellectual	mooring	provided	the	perfect	
environment	for	technicism	to	take	root	and	over	the	next	two	hundred	years	it	
proliferated.		
Some	historians	have	studied	the	development	of	Army	professionalization	and	still	
others	have	examined	technology	and	its	effect	on	the	battlefield,	but	few	have	analyzed	
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the	intellectual	substrate	of	Army	officers	and	its	confluence	with	technology.			In	other	
words,	this	substrate	was	the	Army	officer	mentalität	that	developed	from	the	peculiar	
American	experience.		
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